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Volume 14 (2022): Edition 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)

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Volume 12 (2020): Edition 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 55 (December 2019)
Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 54 (December 2019)
Special Edition: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)

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Volume 10 (2018): Edition 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)

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Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 31 (November 2011)

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Normativity and Rationality

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Special Edition: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

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Special Edition: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 1 (2004): Edition 17 (November 2004)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

9 Articles
access type Accès libre

Editor’s Note

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 1 - 2

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Moral emotions

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 3 - 15

Résumé

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

access type Accès libre

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 16 - 20

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

access type Accès libre

Reasons, contents and experiences

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 21 - 41

Résumé

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

access type Accès libre

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 42 - 64

Résumé

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

access type Accès libre

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 65 - 73

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

access type Accès libre

Truth and Truthmakers

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 74 - 78

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Ideal Code, Real World

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 79 - 84

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 84 - 90

Résumé

9 Articles
access type Accès libre

Editor’s Note

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 1 - 2

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Moral emotions

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 3 - 15

Résumé

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

access type Accès libre

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 16 - 20

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

access type Accès libre

Reasons, contents and experiences

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 21 - 41

Résumé

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

access type Accès libre

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 42 - 64

Résumé

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

access type Accès libre

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 65 - 73

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

access type Accès libre

Truth and Truthmakers

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 74 - 78

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Ideal Code, Real World

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 79 - 84

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 84 - 90

Résumé

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