Volume 14 (2022): Edition 66 (December 2022) Special Edition: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volume 14 (2022): Edition 65 (November 2022)
Volume 14 (2022): Edition 64 (May 2022)
Volume 13 (2021): Edition 63 (December 2021) Special Edition on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volume 13 (2021): Edition 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Editions at Their Intersection
Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)
Volume 13 (2021): Edition 60 (May 2021)
Volume 12 (2020): Edition 59 (December 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Edition 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volume 12 (2020): Edition 57 (November 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Edition 56 (May 2020)
Volume 11 (2019): Edition 55 (December 2019) Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volume 11 (2019): Edition 54 (December 2019) Special Edition: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)
Volume 11 (2019): Edition 52 (May 2019)
Volume 10 (2018): Edition 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Edition 49 (November 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Edition 48 (May 2018)
Volume 9 (2017): Edition 47 (December 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Edition 46 (November 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Edition 45 (October 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Edition 44 (May 2017)
Volume 8 (2016): Edition 43 (November 2016)
Volume 8 (2016): Edition 42 (May 2016)
Volume 7 (2015): Edition 41 (November 2015)
Volume 7 (2015): Edition 40 (May 2015)
Volume 6 (2014): Edition 39 (November 2014)
Volume 6 (2014): Edition 38 (May 2014)
Volume 5 (2013): Edition 37 (November 2013)
Volume 5 (2013): Edition 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Volume 5 (2013): Edition 35 (May 2013)
Volume 4 (2012): Edition 34 (December 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Edition 33 (November 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Edition 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volume 4 (2011): Edition 31 (November 2011)
Volume 4 (2011): Edition 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volume 4 (2010): Edition 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Volume 3 (2010): Edition 28 (May 2010)
Volume 3 (2009): Edition 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Volume 3 (2009): Edition 26 (May 2009)
Volume 3 (2008): Edition 25 (November 2008)
Volume 2 (2008): Edition 24 (May 2008)
Volume 2 (2007): Edition 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Volume 2 (2007): Edition 22 (May 2007)
Volume 2 (2006): Edition 21 (November 2006)
Volume 1 (2006): Edition 20 (May 2006)
Volume 1 (2005): Edition 19 (November 2005)
Volume 1 (2005): Edition 18 (May 2005)
Volume 1 (2004): Edition 17 (November 2004)
Volume 1 (2004): Edition 16 (May 2004)
Volume 1 (2003): Edition 15 (November 2003)
Volume 1 (2003): Edition 14 (May 2003)
Volume 1 (2002): Edition 13 (November 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Edition 11 (November 2001)
Volume 1 (2002): Edition 11-12 (May 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Edition 10 (May 2001)
Volume 1 (2000): Edition 9 (November 2000)
Volume 1 (2000): Edition 8 (May 2000)
Volume 1 (1999): Edition 7 (November 1999)
Volume 1 (1999): Edition 6 (May 1999)
Volume 1 (1998): Edition 5-2 (November 1998) Special Edition: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volume 1 (1998): Edition 5-1 (June 1998) Special Edition: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate.
A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.
Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) teleosemantics is not committed to any problematic view on the color realism-antirealism debate.
A well-known (roughly Fregean) strategy for dealing with Kripke’s 1979 Pierre-puzzle is to appeal to differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of Pierre’s beliefs. However, differing senses or modes of presentation in the characterization of an agent’s beliefs conceal, in this context, another equally challenging puzzle about disagreement. Apparently therefore, theorists are required to pay attention to both sorts of puzzles in order to offer a satisfactory solution to the Pierre case.