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SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

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SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Normativity and Rationality

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Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 2 (2007): Edition 22 (May 2007)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

6 Articles
access type Accès libre

Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 91 - 100

Résumé

Abstract

The claim that zombies are conceivable is a premise of one of the most important anti-physicalist arguments. Eric Marcus (2004) challenges that premise in two novel ways. He observes that conceiving of zombies would require imagining total subjective absence. And this, he argues, we cannot do. However, his argument turns on the assumption that absence is imaginable only against a background of presence and, I argue, that assumption is dubious. Second, he proposes that the premise’s intuitive plausibility derives from a scope confusion. However, I argue, on reflection that proposal is untenable.

access type Accès libre

Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism and the transparency of qualia

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 101 - 113

Résumé

Abstract

Qualia realists hold that experience’s phenomenal character is a non-representational property of experience, what they call qualia. Representationalists hold that phenomenal character is a representational property of experience — there are no qualia (in this particular sense of the word). The transparency of qualia to introspection would seem to count as reason for rejecting qualia realism and favouring representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker defends a middle ground, call it moderate qualia realism, which seems to provide a response to the problem of transparency that in consistent with qualia realism. According to this view, while phenomenal character is a representational property of experience, it is determined by certain non-representational properties of experience, namely qualia. Shoemaker explains the apparent transparency of qualia by claiming that, while qualia are not directly introspectible, they are indirectly introspectible. I argue that neither Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism nor his account of indirect introspection provide the qualia realist with a plausible solution to the problem of transparency.

access type Accès libre

Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 115 - 130

Résumé

Abstract

Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological impossibility. In this paper I analyse the arguments for (Williams 1973; Scott-Kakures 1993; Adler 2002) and against (Bennett 1990;Radcliffe 1997) both types of claim and, in particular, evaluate the bearing that putative cases of self-deception have on the arguments in defence of voluntarism about belief. For it would seem that if it is the case that self-induced cases of self-deception are indeed possible, then voluntarism about belief could be true after all. Bennett claims that Williams’ argument for the impossibility case proves too much in that if it is successful in ruling out direct doxastic voluntarism, it is also successful in ruling out cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism. If cases of self-deception can also be cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism, then such cases support the argument against the impossibility case. I argue that Bennett is right in claiming that Williams’ argument proves too much, that cases of self-deception are indeed also sometimes cases of indirect self-deception and so that they cause genuine trouble for the conceptual impossibility case. However, I also argue that this is the only genuine worry for Williams’ argument. I end, while considering whether cases of self-deception can tell us anything about the psychological possibility of direct doxastic control, by suggesting a way of establishing the conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic control that circumvents Bennett’s counter-argument.

access type Accès libre

S5 solution to the red hat puzzle

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 131 - 137

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that the solution to the Red Hat Problem, a puzzle derived from interactive epistemic logic, requires S5. Interactive epistemic logic is set out in formal terms, and an attempt to solve the red hat puzzle is made in Kτσ, Kρτ, and Kρσ, each of which fails, showing that a stronger system, Kτσρ is required.

access type Accès libre

The Realm of Reason

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 139 - 146

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Thought’s Footing: Themes in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 146 - 152

Résumé

6 Articles
access type Accès libre

Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 91 - 100

Résumé

Abstract

The claim that zombies are conceivable is a premise of one of the most important anti-physicalist arguments. Eric Marcus (2004) challenges that premise in two novel ways. He observes that conceiving of zombies would require imagining total subjective absence. And this, he argues, we cannot do. However, his argument turns on the assumption that absence is imaginable only against a background of presence and, I argue, that assumption is dubious. Second, he proposes that the premise’s intuitive plausibility derives from a scope confusion. However, I argue, on reflection that proposal is untenable.

access type Accès libre

Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism and the transparency of qualia

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 101 - 113

Résumé

Abstract

Qualia realists hold that experience’s phenomenal character is a non-representational property of experience, what they call qualia. Representationalists hold that phenomenal character is a representational property of experience — there are no qualia (in this particular sense of the word). The transparency of qualia to introspection would seem to count as reason for rejecting qualia realism and favouring representationalism. Sydney Shoemaker defends a middle ground, call it moderate qualia realism, which seems to provide a response to the problem of transparency that in consistent with qualia realism. According to this view, while phenomenal character is a representational property of experience, it is determined by certain non-representational properties of experience, namely qualia. Shoemaker explains the apparent transparency of qualia by claiming that, while qualia are not directly introspectible, they are indirectly introspectible. I argue that neither Shoemaker’s moderate qualia realism nor his account of indirect introspection provide the qualia realist with a plausible solution to the problem of transparency.

access type Accès libre

Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 115 - 130

Résumé

Abstract

Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological impossibility. In this paper I analyse the arguments for (Williams 1973; Scott-Kakures 1993; Adler 2002) and against (Bennett 1990;Radcliffe 1997) both types of claim and, in particular, evaluate the bearing that putative cases of self-deception have on the arguments in defence of voluntarism about belief. For it would seem that if it is the case that self-induced cases of self-deception are indeed possible, then voluntarism about belief could be true after all. Bennett claims that Williams’ argument for the impossibility case proves too much in that if it is successful in ruling out direct doxastic voluntarism, it is also successful in ruling out cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism. If cases of self-deception can also be cases of indirect doxastic voluntarism, then such cases support the argument against the impossibility case. I argue that Bennett is right in claiming that Williams’ argument proves too much, that cases of self-deception are indeed also sometimes cases of indirect self-deception and so that they cause genuine trouble for the conceptual impossibility case. However, I also argue that this is the only genuine worry for Williams’ argument. I end, while considering whether cases of self-deception can tell us anything about the psychological possibility of direct doxastic control, by suggesting a way of establishing the conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic control that circumvents Bennett’s counter-argument.

access type Accès libre

S5 solution to the red hat puzzle

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 131 - 137

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that the solution to the Red Hat Problem, a puzzle derived from interactive epistemic logic, requires S5. Interactive epistemic logic is set out in formal terms, and an attempt to solve the red hat puzzle is made in Kτσ, Kρτ, and Kρσ, each of which fails, showing that a stronger system, Kτσρ is required.

access type Accès libre

The Realm of Reason

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 139 - 146

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Thought’s Footing: Themes in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 146 - 152

Résumé

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