- Detalles de la revista
- Formato
- Revista
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- Publicado por primera vez
- 01 Dec 1996
- Periodo de publicación
- 4 veces al año
- Idiomas
- Inglés, Portuguese
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Resumen
Resumen
Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.
- Acceso abierto
Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem
Páginas: 16 - 20
Resumen
In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis
Resumen
I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.
- Acceso abierto
Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit
Páginas: 42 - 64
Resumen
Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that
- Acceso abierto
On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum
Páginas: 65 - 73
Resumen
In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.
Resumen
Resumen
- Acceso abierto
Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism
Páginas: 84 - 90