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SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

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Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

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Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)

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SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

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Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Normativity and Rationality

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Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 60 (May 2021)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

3 Articles
Accès libre

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 1 - 25

Résumé

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Mots clés

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Accès libre

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 27 - 50

Résumé

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Mots clés

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Accès libre

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 51 - 69

Résumé

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Mots clés

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes
3 Articles
Accès libre

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 1 - 25

Résumé

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Mots clés

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Accès libre

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 27 - 50

Résumé

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Mots clés

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Accès libre

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Publié en ligne: 17 Jul 2021
Pages: 51 - 69

Résumé

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Mots clés

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes

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