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SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

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SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

5 Articles
access type Accès libre

Disputatio Symposium on Sally Haslanger’s Work

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 169 - 172

Résumé

Abstract

The articles collected in this symposium are result of the workshop Doing Justice to the Social, which was dedicated to the work of Sally Haslanger. The workshop took place at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona between the 6 and 8 June 2016. The workshop was also the 10th Meeting of the NOMOS Network for Practical Philosophy. The network meetings focus on philosophical issues connected with practical concerns, examined in an open-minded manner. This sympo- sium collects articles by Rachel Sterken, Esa Díaz-León, and Jennifer Saul, and also Sally Haslanger’s reply to authors.

Mots clés

  • Sally Haslanger
  • social construction
  • structuralism
  • individualism
  • implicit biases
access type Accès libre

The Structures of Social Structural Explanation: Comments on Haslanger’s What is (Social) Structural Explanation?

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 173 - 199

Résumé

Abstract

In a recent paper (Haslanger 2016), Sally Haslanger argues for the importance of structural explanation. Roughly, a structural explana- tion of the behaviour of a given object appeals to features of the struc- tures—physical, social, or otherwise—the object is embedded in. It is opposed to individualistic explanations, where what is appealed to is just the object and its properties. For example, an individualistic explanation of why someone got the grade they did might appeal to features of the essay they wrote—its being well-written, answering the set question, etc. But if the class is graded on a curve, then a better explanation will appeal to features of the class—of the social structure in which the student is embedded. That she wrote a better paper than 90% of the class explains better than that she wrote a well-argued paper. In this paper, I get clear as to various candidate concepts of structure that we might appeal to in structural explanations, argue that Haslanger’s preferred account is lacking, and present an alterna- tive that is more conducive to social structural explanation.

Mots clés

  • Explanation
  • social philosophy
  • social structures
  • Haslanger
access type Accès libre

On Haslanger’s Meta-Metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 201 - 216

Résumé

Abstract

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017).

Mots clés

  • Ontological realism
  • gender
  • race
  • social constructionism
  • concepts
access type Accès libre

(How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 217 - 244

Résumé

Abstract

As the phenomenon of implicit bias has become increasingly widely known and accepted, a variety of criticisms have similarly gained in prominence. This paper focuses on one particular set of criticisms, generally made from the political left, of what Sally Haslanger calls “implicit bias stories”—a broad term encompassing a wide range of discourses from media discussions to academic papers to implicit bias training. According to this line of thought, implicit bias stories are counterproductive because they serve to distract from the structural and institutional factors that underlie oppression of social groups. This paper argues on the contrary that implicit bias stories, properly told, can help direct attention and concern to structural and institutional factors, and indeed may be especially helpful in motiving action. The key, however, is to tell these stories properly. When implicit bias sto- ries are told in the wrong way, they are indeed counterproductive. This paper looks in detail at several examples of good and bad implicit bias stories, examining what makes some of them counterproductive and others highly effective in motivating action to combat social injustice.

Mots clés

  • Implicit bias
  • structural injustice
  • racism
  • sexism
  • individualism
access type Accès libre

Social Explanation: Structures, Stories, and Ontology. A Reply to Díaz León, Saul, and Sterken

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 245 - 273

Résumé

Abstract

In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about realism with respect to gender and race. I aim to demon- strate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy.

Mots clés

  • Social structure
  • structural explanation
  • implicit bias
  • gender
  • social ontology
5 Articles
access type Accès libre

Disputatio Symposium on Sally Haslanger’s Work

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 169 - 172

Résumé

Abstract

The articles collected in this symposium are result of the workshop Doing Justice to the Social, which was dedicated to the work of Sally Haslanger. The workshop took place at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona between the 6 and 8 June 2016. The workshop was also the 10th Meeting of the NOMOS Network for Practical Philosophy. The network meetings focus on philosophical issues connected with practical concerns, examined in an open-minded manner. This sympo- sium collects articles by Rachel Sterken, Esa Díaz-León, and Jennifer Saul, and also Sally Haslanger’s reply to authors.

Mots clés

  • Sally Haslanger
  • social construction
  • structuralism
  • individualism
  • implicit biases
access type Accès libre

The Structures of Social Structural Explanation: Comments on Haslanger’s What is (Social) Structural Explanation?

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 173 - 199

Résumé

Abstract

In a recent paper (Haslanger 2016), Sally Haslanger argues for the importance of structural explanation. Roughly, a structural explana- tion of the behaviour of a given object appeals to features of the struc- tures—physical, social, or otherwise—the object is embedded in. It is opposed to individualistic explanations, where what is appealed to is just the object and its properties. For example, an individualistic explanation of why someone got the grade they did might appeal to features of the essay they wrote—its being well-written, answering the set question, etc. But if the class is graded on a curve, then a better explanation will appeal to features of the class—of the social structure in which the student is embedded. That she wrote a better paper than 90% of the class explains better than that she wrote a well-argued paper. In this paper, I get clear as to various candidate concepts of structure that we might appeal to in structural explanations, argue that Haslanger’s preferred account is lacking, and present an alterna- tive that is more conducive to social structural explanation.

Mots clés

  • Explanation
  • social philosophy
  • social structures
  • Haslanger
access type Accès libre

On Haslanger’s Meta-Metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 201 - 216

Résumé

Abstract

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017).

Mots clés

  • Ontological realism
  • gender
  • race
  • social constructionism
  • concepts
access type Accès libre

(How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 217 - 244

Résumé

Abstract

As the phenomenon of implicit bias has become increasingly widely known and accepted, a variety of criticisms have similarly gained in prominence. This paper focuses on one particular set of criticisms, generally made from the political left, of what Sally Haslanger calls “implicit bias stories”—a broad term encompassing a wide range of discourses from media discussions to academic papers to implicit bias training. According to this line of thought, implicit bias stories are counterproductive because they serve to distract from the structural and institutional factors that underlie oppression of social groups. This paper argues on the contrary that implicit bias stories, properly told, can help direct attention and concern to structural and institutional factors, and indeed may be especially helpful in motiving action. The key, however, is to tell these stories properly. When implicit bias sto- ries are told in the wrong way, they are indeed counterproductive. This paper looks in detail at several examples of good and bad implicit bias stories, examining what makes some of them counterproductive and others highly effective in motivating action to combat social injustice.

Mots clés

  • Implicit bias
  • structural injustice
  • racism
  • sexism
  • individualism
access type Accès libre

Social Explanation: Structures, Stories, and Ontology. A Reply to Díaz León, Saul, and Sterken

Publié en ligne: 20 Jun 2019
Pages: 245 - 273

Résumé

Abstract

In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about realism with respect to gender and race. I aim to demon- strate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy.

Mots clés

  • Social structure
  • structural explanation
  • implicit bias
  • gender
  • social ontology

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