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SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

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Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

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Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)

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SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

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Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Normativity and Rationality

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Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

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Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 17 (November 2004)

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

9 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editor’s Note

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 1 - 2

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Moral emotions

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 3 - 15

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 16 - 20

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Reasons, contents and experiences

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 21 - 41

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 42 - 64

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 65 - 73

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Truth and Truthmakers

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 74 - 78

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Ideal Code, Real World

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 79 - 84

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 84 - 90

Zusammenfassung

9 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editor’s Note

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 1 - 2

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Moral emotions

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 3 - 15

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 16 - 20

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Reasons, contents and experiences

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 21 - 41

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 42 - 64

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 65 - 73

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Truth and Truthmakers

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 74 - 78

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Ideal Code, Real World

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 79 - 84

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 84 - 90

Zusammenfassung

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