Magazine et Edition

Volume 14 (2022): Edition 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Editions at Their Intersection

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 55 (December 2019)
Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 54 (December 2019)
Special Edition: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edition 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edition 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edition 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edition 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edition 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edition 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edition 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edition 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edition 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edition 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edition 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edition 24 (May 2008)

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Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edition 22 (May 2007)

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Volume 1 (2006): Edition 20 (May 2006)

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Volume 1 (2000): Edition 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edition 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edition 7 (November 1999)

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Volume 1 (1998): Edition 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edition 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edition s2 (November 1998)
Special Edition: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1997): Edition 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1996): Edition 1 (December 1996)

Volume 1 (1998): Edition s1 (June 1998)
Special Edition: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

5 Articles
Accès libre

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 71 - 72

Résumé

Accès libre

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 73 - 94

Résumé

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Mots clés

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Accès libre

The Aim of Inquiry

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 95 - 119

Résumé

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Mots clés

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Accès libre

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 121 - 141

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Mots clés

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Accès libre

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 143 - 158

Résumé

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Mots clés

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will
5 Articles
Accès libre

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 71 - 72

Résumé

Accès libre

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 73 - 94

Résumé

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Mots clés

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Accès libre

The Aim of Inquiry

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 95 - 119

Résumé

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Mots clés

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Accès libre

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 121 - 141

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Mots clés

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Accès libre

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Publié en ligne: 23 Nov 2021
Pages: 143 - 158

Résumé

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Mots clés

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will

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