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Volume 14 (2022): Issue 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Issues at Their Intersection

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Issue 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 55 (December 2019)
Special Issue: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 54 (December 2019)
Special Issue: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Issue 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Issue 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Issue 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Issue 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Issue 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Issue 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Issue 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Issue 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Issue 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Issue 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Issue 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Issue 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Issue 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Issue 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Issue 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Issue 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Issue 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Issue 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Issue 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Issue 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Issue 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Issue 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Issue 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Issue 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Issue 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Issue 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Issue 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Issue 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Issue 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Issue 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Issue 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Issue 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Issue 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Issue 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Issue 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Issue s2 (November 1998)
Special Issue: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1997): Issue 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1996): Issue 1 (December 1996)

Volume 1 (1998): Issue s1 (June 1998)
Special Issue: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 17 (November 2004)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2182-2875
First Published
16 Apr 2017
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

9 Articles
Open Access

Editor’s Note

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 1 - 2

Abstract

Open Access

Moral emotions

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 3 - 15

Abstract

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

Open Access

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 16 - 20

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

Open Access

Reasons, contents and experiences

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 21 - 41

Abstract

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

Open Access

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 42 - 64

Abstract

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

Open Access

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 65 - 73

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

Open Access

Truth and Truthmakers

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 74 - 78

Abstract

Open Access

Ideal Code, Real World

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 79 - 84

Abstract

Open Access

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 84 - 90

Abstract

9 Articles
Open Access

Editor’s Note

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 1 - 2

Abstract

Open Access

Moral emotions

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 3 - 15

Abstract

Abstract

Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they (and other emotions) are moral emotions. In (I) I will deal with the views of some other authors and in (II) and (III) I will explain my own account.

Open Access

Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 16 - 20

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem.’ Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction ef, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty.

Open Access

Reasons, contents and experiences

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 21 - 41

Abstract

Abstract

I propose what seems a plausible interpretation of the suggestion that the fact that someone has or lacks the capacity to make inferences of certain kinds should be taken as evidence that the contents of the states involved in these inferences are conceptual/nonconceptual. I then argue that there is no obvious way in which this line of thought could be exploited to help draw the line separating conceptual from nonconceptual contents. This will lead me to clarify in what sense perceptual experiences can be taken as providing reasons for beliefs.

Open Access

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 42 - 64

Abstract

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

Open Access

On Bickle’s failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 65 - 73

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I discuss John Bickle’s attempt to provide a formal procedure to locate a certain reduction relation in the Hooker’s and Church-land’s New wave reductionist spectrum. Bickle’s main motivation is to react against the ‘Khunnian flavored,’ internal-to-scientific-practice pragmatist solution endorsed by Patricia Churchland when faced with the lack of a formal and external way to identify a reduction in the spectrum. Bickle tries to solve this problem by reformulating Hooker’s insights within a structuralist framework so establishing an external-toscientific-practice formal solution. I show that Bickle fails on his attempt and, as a consequence, we should adopt Patricia Churchland pragmatic stance regarding reductionist and ontological decisions.

Open Access

Truth and Truthmakers

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 74 - 78

Abstract

Open Access

Ideal Code, Real World

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 79 - 84

Abstract

Open Access

Defending Science — Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism

Published Online: 31 Dec 2018
Page range: 84 - 90

Abstract

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