Magazine et Edition

Volume 14 (2022): Edition 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 55 (December 2019)
Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 54 (December 2019)
Special Edition: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edition 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edition 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edition 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edition 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edition 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edition 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edition 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edition 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edition 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edition 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edition 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edition 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edition 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edition 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Edition 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edition 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Edition 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Edition 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Edition 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Edition 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Edition 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Edition 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Edition 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Edition 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Edition 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edition 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Edition 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edition 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edition 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edition 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edition 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Edition 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Edition 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edition 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edition s2 (November 1998)
Special Edition: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1997): Edition 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1996): Edition 1 (December 1996)

Volume 1 (1998): Edition s1 (June 1998)
Special Edition: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 4 (2012): Edition 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

8 Articles
access type Accès libre

New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 317 - 322

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the Quine-Maddy Debate

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 323 - 342

Résumé

Abstract

This paper considers Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in the context of Quine’s scientific naturalism. The aim of this proposal is to account for the acceptability of mathematics on scientific grounds without committing to revisionism about mathematical practice entailed by the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. It has been argued that Maddy’s mathematical naturalism makes inconsistent assumptions on the role of mathematics in scientific explanations to the effect that it cannot distinguish mathematics from pseudo-science. I shall clarify Maddy’s arguments and show that the objection can be overcome. I shall then reformulate a novel version of the objection and consider a possible answer, and I shall conclude that mathematical naturalism does not ultimately provide a viable strategy for accommodating an anti-revisionary stance on mathematics within a Quinean naturalist framework.

Mots clés

  • Quinean scientific naturalism
  • confirmational holism
  • indispensability argument
  • revisionism
  • mathematical naturalism
access type Accès libre

Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 343 - 360

Résumé

Abstract

Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress the extent to which this is so in both cases, in order to attain a better appreciation of the Quinean heritage of IA.

Mots clés

  • Quine’s philosophy of mathematics
  • indispensability arguments
  • Platonism
  • naturalism
  • inference to the best explanation
access type Accès libre

All the existences that there are

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 361 - 383

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the correct view in ontology. Finally, I will add some methodological remarks as to why this debate has to be articulated from the point of view of reality, i.e., by speaking of properties, rather than from the point of view of language, i.e., by speaking of predicates (for such properties).

Mots clés

  • Existence
  • Meinongianism
  • subsistence
  • instantiation
  • ontological disagreement
access type Accès libre

The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 385 - 393

Résumé

Abstract

The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself.

Mots clés

  • Indeterminacy of Translation
  • Kripkean Normativity Argument
  • Kripkean Finiteness Argument
  • Humean Skepticism
  • Naïve Realism
access type Accès libre

Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 395 - 412

Résumé

Abstract

The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to these questions, the paper tries to suggest a Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mindreading.

Mots clés

  • Mindreading
  • Simulation Theory
  • Empathy
  • Folk-psychology
  • Rationality
access type Accès libre

Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 413 - 417

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Physicalism

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 417 - 425

Résumé

8 Articles
access type Accès libre

New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 317 - 322

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the Quine-Maddy Debate

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 323 - 342

Résumé

Abstract

This paper considers Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in the context of Quine’s scientific naturalism. The aim of this proposal is to account for the acceptability of mathematics on scientific grounds without committing to revisionism about mathematical practice entailed by the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. It has been argued that Maddy’s mathematical naturalism makes inconsistent assumptions on the role of mathematics in scientific explanations to the effect that it cannot distinguish mathematics from pseudo-science. I shall clarify Maddy’s arguments and show that the objection can be overcome. I shall then reformulate a novel version of the objection and consider a possible answer, and I shall conclude that mathematical naturalism does not ultimately provide a viable strategy for accommodating an anti-revisionary stance on mathematics within a Quinean naturalist framework.

Mots clés

  • Quinean scientific naturalism
  • confirmational holism
  • indispensability argument
  • revisionism
  • mathematical naturalism
access type Accès libre

Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 343 - 360

Résumé

Abstract

Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress the extent to which this is so in both cases, in order to attain a better appreciation of the Quinean heritage of IA.

Mots clés

  • Quine’s philosophy of mathematics
  • indispensability arguments
  • Platonism
  • naturalism
  • inference to the best explanation
access type Accès libre

All the existences that there are

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 361 - 383

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the correct view in ontology. Finally, I will add some methodological remarks as to why this debate has to be articulated from the point of view of reality, i.e., by speaking of properties, rather than from the point of view of language, i.e., by speaking of predicates (for such properties).

Mots clés

  • Existence
  • Meinongianism
  • subsistence
  • instantiation
  • ontological disagreement
access type Accès libre

The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 385 - 393

Résumé

Abstract

The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the indeterminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An analogy between Kripke’s arguments and Hume’s argument for epistemological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper shows that the answer to Kripke’s rule-following skepticism is analogous to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself.

Mots clés

  • Indeterminacy of Translation
  • Kripkean Normativity Argument
  • Kripkean Finiteness Argument
  • Humean Skepticism
  • Naïve Realism
access type Accès libre

Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 395 - 412

Résumé

Abstract

The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on mindreading regarding Quine’s legacy and contribution to a new agenda on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine’s account of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the answers to these questions, the paper tries to suggest a Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mindreading.

Mots clés

  • Mindreading
  • Simulation Theory
  • Empathy
  • Folk-psychology
  • Rationality
access type Accès libre

Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 413 - 417

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Physicalism

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 417 - 425

Résumé

Planifiez votre conférence à distance avec Sciendo