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Volume 14 (2022): Edition 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edition 61 (November 2021)

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Volume 12 (2020): Edition 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edition 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 55 (December 2019)
Special Edition: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 54 (December 2019)
Special Edition: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edition 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edition 49 (November 2018)

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Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edition 31 (November 2011)

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Normativity and Rationality

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Special Edition: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

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Special Edition: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

Volume 1 (2005): Edition 19 (November 2005)

Détails du magazine
Format
Magazine
eISSN
2182-2875
Première publication
16 Apr 2017
Période de publication
4 fois par an
Langues
Anglais

Chercher

11 Articles
access type Accès libre

A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 205 - 221

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.

access type Accès libre

Time travel and the open future

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 223 - 232

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.

access type Accès libre

The irreducibility of consciousness

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 233 - 247

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in the discussion. Clarifying this notion in turn helps to clarify what it means to claim that consciousness is irreducible, and provides insight into the implications that the truth of this claim would have for the dualism-materialism debate. Ultimately, I suggest that the sort of irreducibility that can be motivated by the zombie thought experiment is not sufficient to require the rejection of materialism.

access type Accès libre

Baier and Cottingham on the meaning of life

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 251 - 264

Résumé

Abstract

I examine two recent books by analytic philosophers that address the underexplored topic of whether the meaning of life depends on the existence of a supernatural realm including God and a soul. John Cottingham’s On the Meaning of Life defends a supernaturalist conception of life’s meaning, whereas Kurt Baier’s Problems of Life and Death defends the opposite, naturalist perspective. I show that their respective arguments are worth serious consideration, indicate some potential weaknesses in them, and suggest some other argumentative strategies that those interested in this fascinating topic might pursue elsewhere in more depth.

access type Accès libre

Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 265 - 270

Résumé

access type Accès libre

The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 271 - 277

Résumé

access type Accès libre

How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 277 - 282

Résumé

access type Accès libre

The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 282 - 286

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 286 - 289

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 289 - 295

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Towards Non-Being: the Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 295 - 301

Résumé

11 Articles
access type Accès libre

A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 205 - 221

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.

access type Accès libre

Time travel and the open future

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 223 - 232

Résumé

Abstract

I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.

access type Accès libre

The irreducibility of consciousness

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 233 - 247

Résumé

Abstract

In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in the discussion. Clarifying this notion in turn helps to clarify what it means to claim that consciousness is irreducible, and provides insight into the implications that the truth of this claim would have for the dualism-materialism debate. Ultimately, I suggest that the sort of irreducibility that can be motivated by the zombie thought experiment is not sufficient to require the rejection of materialism.

access type Accès libre

Baier and Cottingham on the meaning of life

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 251 - 264

Résumé

Abstract

I examine two recent books by analytic philosophers that address the underexplored topic of whether the meaning of life depends on the existence of a supernatural realm including God and a soul. John Cottingham’s On the Meaning of Life defends a supernaturalist conception of life’s meaning, whereas Kurt Baier’s Problems of Life and Death defends the opposite, naturalist perspective. I show that their respective arguments are worth serious consideration, indicate some potential weaknesses in them, and suggest some other argumentative strategies that those interested in this fascinating topic might pursue elsewhere in more depth.

access type Accès libre

Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 265 - 270

Résumé

access type Accès libre

The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 271 - 277

Résumé

access type Accès libre

How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 277 - 282

Résumé

access type Accès libre

The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 282 - 286

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 286 - 289

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 289 - 295

Résumé

access type Accès libre

Towards Non-Being: the Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality

Publié en ligne: 31 Dec 2018
Pages: 295 - 301

Résumé

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