- Journal Details
- Format
- Journal
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- First Published
- 01 Dec 1996
- Publication timeframe
- 4 times per year
- Languages
- English, Portuguese
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Abstract
I argue that virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality. In particular, I argue for virtual digitalism, on which virtual objects are real digital objects, and against virtual fictionalism, on which virtual objects are fictional objects. I also argue that perception in virtual reality need not be illusory, and that life in virtual worlds can have roughly the same sort of value as life in non-virtual worlds.
Keywords
- Virtual reality
- augmented reality
- realism
- fictionalism
- structuralism
- Open Access
Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena
Page range: 353 - 381
Abstract
In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing so, I shall point out what theoretical requirements are imposed on naïve realists who characterize hallucinations as non-visual-sensory phenomena.
Keywords
- Naïverealism
- hallucination
- introspection
- visual experience
- disjunctivism
Abstract
Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.
Keywords
- Paradoxes
- truth
- vagueness
- Sorites
- the Liar
- Open Access
De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness
Page range: 401 - 422
Abstract
De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs.
Keywords
- De se
- self-ascription
- property theory
- essential indexical
- lived body