- Journal Details
- Format
- Journal
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- First Published
- 01 Dec 1996
- Publication timeframe
- 4 times per year
- Languages
- English, Portuguese
Search
Abstract
Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.
Keywords
- Knowledge
- vagueness
- relativism
Abstract
Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.
Keywords
- Consciousness
- Misrepresentation
- Higher-order thought
- Change Blindness
- HOT
- Open Access
Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation
Page range: 57 - 92
Abstract
Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.
Keywords
- Teleosemantics
- representation
- intentionality
- misrepresentation
- mental content
Abstract
This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.
Keywords
- Intentional objects
- intentionality
- Tim Crane
- entity
- existence
Abstract
Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s
Keywords
- Knowing how
- practical knowledge
- intellectualism
- David Wiggins
- Aristotle
- Open Access
Seeing Things as they are: A Theory of Perception
Page range: 125 - 131