Volume 14 (2022): Issue 66 (December 2022) Special Issue: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volume 14 (2022): Issue 65 (November 2022)
Volume 14 (2022): Issue 64 (May 2022)
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 63 (December 2021) Special Issue on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Issues at Their Intersection
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 61 (November 2021)
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 59 (December 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 57 (November 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 56 (May 2020)
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 55 (December 2019) Special Issue: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 54 (December 2019) Special Issue: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 53 (November 2019)
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Volume 10 (2018): Issue 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 50 (December 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 49 (November 2018)
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Volume 9 (2017): Issue 47 (December 2017)
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Volume 8 (2016): Issue 43 (November 2016)
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Volume 7 (2015): Issue 41 (November 2015)
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Volume 6 (2014): Issue 39 (November 2014)
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Volume 5 (2013): Issue 37 (November 2013)
Volume 5 (2013): Issue 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
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Volume 4 (2012): Issue 34 (December 2012)
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Volume 4 (2012): Issue 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 31 (November 2011)
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volume 4 (2010): Issue 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
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Volume 3 (2009): Issue 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
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Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-2 (November 1998) Special Issue: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-1 (June 1998) Special Issue: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 113 - 163
Abstract
Abstract
A theory of conceptual development must provide an account of the innate representational repertoire, must characterize how these initial representations differ from the adult state, and must provide an account of the processes that transform the initial into mature representations. In The Origin of Concepts (Carey 2009), I defend three theses: (1) the initial state includes rich conceptual representations, (2) nonetheless, there are radical discontinuities between early and later developing conceptual systems, (3) Quinean bootstrapping is one learning mechanism that underlies the creation of new representational resources, enabling such discontinuity. Here I argue that the theory of conceptual development developed in The Origin of Concepts constrains our theories of concepts themselves, and addresses two of Fodor’s challenges to cognitive science; namely, to show how learning could possibly lead to an increase in expressive power and to defeat Mad Dog Nativism, the thesis that all concepts lexicalized as mono-morphemic words are innate. In response to Fodor, I show that, and how, new primitives in a language of thought can be learned, that there are easy routes and hard ones to doing so, and that characterizing the learning mechanisms in each illuminates how conceptual role partially determines conceptual content.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 165 - 191
Abstract
Abstract
This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a reply to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Åqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Section 4 explains how the view differs from contextualist strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals. Finally, section 5 addresses the thorny issue of disjunctive antecedents.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 193 - 206
Abstract
Abstract
I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 207 - 229
Abstract
Abstract
Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in relation to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.
A theory of conceptual development must provide an account of the innate representational repertoire, must characterize how these initial representations differ from the adult state, and must provide an account of the processes that transform the initial into mature representations. In The Origin of Concepts (Carey 2009), I defend three theses: (1) the initial state includes rich conceptual representations, (2) nonetheless, there are radical discontinuities between early and later developing conceptual systems, (3) Quinean bootstrapping is one learning mechanism that underlies the creation of new representational resources, enabling such discontinuity. Here I argue that the theory of conceptual development developed in The Origin of Concepts constrains our theories of concepts themselves, and addresses two of Fodor’s challenges to cognitive science; namely, to show how learning could possibly lead to an increase in expressive power and to defeat Mad Dog Nativism, the thesis that all concepts lexicalized as mono-morphemic words are innate. In response to Fodor, I show that, and how, new primitives in a language of thought can be learned, that there are easy routes and hard ones to doing so, and that characterizing the learning mechanisms in each illuminates how conceptual role partially determines conceptual content.
This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a reply to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Åqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Section 4 explains how the view differs from contextualist strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals. Finally, section 5 addresses the thorny issue of disjunctive antecedents.
I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends my reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in relation to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.