- Journal Details
- Format
- Journal
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- First Published
- 01 Dec 1996
- Publication timeframe
- 4 times per year
- Languages
- English, Portuguese
Search
- Open Access
Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties
Page range: 1 - 19
Abstract
Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and space-time points, whether pure powers need to occupy space, and how to account for the movement of pure powers through space-time. Given Point Theory, dispositional essentialists should maintain that sparse properties are pure powers.
Keywords
- Dispositions
- Powers
- Powerful Qualities
- Essentialism
- Sparse Properties
Abstract
We present a neglected heterodox version of Zeno’s paradox of the Stadium, underlining some problems that a discrete kinematics would have to account for. Building on our reconstruction of the Stadium argument we provide new arguments to show that a discrete kinematics cannot uphold three independently plausible assumptions about motion, that we label
Keywords
- Zeno’s Paradoxes
- Discreteness
- Space and Time
- Motion
- Velocity
Abstract
Yablo argued that some metaphors are representationally essential: they enable us to express contents that we would not be able to express without them. He defended a fictionalist view of mathematical language by making the case that it similarly serves as a representational aid. Against this, Colyvan argued that metaphorical/figurative language can never play an essential role in explanation and that mathematical language often does, hence concluding that Yablo’s fictionalism is untenable. I show that Colyvan’s thesis about explanation is highly implausible in the absence of a challenge to Yablo’s position on representationally essential metaphors, which Colyvan does not attempt. I also briefly discuss other attempts to produce a simple knock-out argument against fictionalism and show them wanting.
Keywords
- Explanation
- metaphor
- figurative language
- fictionalism
- ontology
- belief
- make-believe
- acceptance
- fictionalist attitude
- fictionalist acceptance
- literal use
- figurative use
- paraphrase
- Stephen Yablo
- Mark Colyvan
Abstract
I argue that, contrary to an idea to be found in popularizations of time travel, one cannot more easily multiply oneself by taking younger versions of oneself back in time than by travelling back in time on one’s own. The reason is that the suggested multiplication of the traveller is, from a global perspective, only apparent.
Keywords
- Time-travel
- duplication
- identity
- space-time
- fallacious reasoning
- Open Access
On the Truth-Conditional Relevance of Modes of Presentation
Page range: 57 - 66
Abstract
Anne Bezuidenhout 1996 presents an argument for the claim that modes of presentation associated with referential terms are truth-conditionally relevant. I argue that her argument is flawed in light of the very same view on the interplay between reference and pragmatics she endorses.
Keywords
- Modes of Presentation
- Reference
- Pragmatics
- Truth Conditions
- Open Access
The Illusion of the Experience of the Passage of Time
Page range: 67 - 80
Abstract
Supporters of the A-theory of time sometimes refer to an alleged experience of the passage of time in support of their theory. In this paper I argue that it is an illusion that we experience the passage of time, for such an experience is impossible. My argument relies on the general assertion that experience is contingent, in the sense that if it is possible to experience the passage of time, it is also possible to experience that time does not pass. Having established this claim, I argue that it is impossible to experience that time does not pass, and hence that it is impossible to experience the passage of time.
Keywords
- Experience
- Hume
- Kant
- passage of time
- Wittgenstein
- Open Access
Saying too Little and Saying too Much. Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said , by Jennifer Saul
Page range: 81 - 91
Abstract
- Open Access
On the Plenitude of Truth. A Defense of Trivialism
Page range: 93 - 98