Volume 14 (2022): Issue 66 (December 2022) Special Issue: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volume 14 (2022): Issue 65 (November 2022)
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Volume 13 (2021): Issue 63 (December 2021) Special Issue on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Issues at Their Intersection
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 61 (November 2021)
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Volume 12 (2020): Issue 59 (December 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 57 (November 2020)
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Volume 11 (2019): Issue 55 (December 2019) Special Issue: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
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Volume 10 (2018): Issue 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
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Volume 9 (2017): Issue 47 (December 2017)
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Volume 4 (2012): Issue 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 31 (November 2011)
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volume 4 (2010): Issue 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
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Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-2 (November 1998) Special Issue: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-1 (June 1998) Special Issue: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 215 - 234
Abstract
Abstract
Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does not require the abandonment of methodological individualism or our commonplace intuitions about individual responsibility. I will also discuss, and reject, a stronger conception of autonomy suggested especially by the work of Pettit that would result in methodological individualism.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 235 - 237
Abstract
Abstract
A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 255 - 270
Abstract
Abstract
‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that standard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 271 - 287
Abstract
Abstract
Miller (2005) and Miller (2008) argue that the branching picture of time is incompatible with the possibility of backwards time travel. In this paper I show that Miller’s conclusion is based on a hidden assumption which, while generally plausible, is unwarranted if time travel is possible. Branching time is, after all, compatible with time travel as Miller characterises it.
Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does not require the abandonment of methodological individualism or our commonplace intuitions about individual responsibility. I will also discuss, and reject, a stronger conception of autonomy suggested especially by the work of Pettit that would result in methodological individualism.
A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., ‘Nothing is both red and green all over’ – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.
‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that standard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can.
Miller (2005) and Miller (2008) argue that the branching picture of time is incompatible with the possibility of backwards time travel. In this paper I show that Miller’s conclusion is based on a hidden assumption which, while generally plausible, is unwarranted if time travel is possible. Branching time is, after all, compatible with time travel as Miller characterises it.