Volume 14 (2022): Issue 66 (December 2022) Special Issue: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volume 14 (2022): Issue 65 (November 2022)
Volume 14 (2022): Issue 64 (May 2022)
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 63 (December 2021) Special Issue on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Issues at Their Intersection
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 61 (November 2021)
Volume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 59 (December 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 57 (November 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Issue 56 (May 2020)
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 55 (December 2019) Special Issue: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 54 (December 2019) Special Issue: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 53 (November 2019)
Volume 11 (2019): Issue 52 (May 2019)
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 50 (December 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 49 (November 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Issue 48 (May 2018)
Volume 9 (2017): Issue 47 (December 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Issue 46 (November 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Issue 45 (October 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Issue 44 (May 2017)
Volume 8 (2016): Issue 43 (November 2016)
Volume 8 (2016): Issue 42 (May 2016)
Volume 7 (2015): Issue 41 (November 2015)
Volume 7 (2015): Issue 40 (May 2015)
Volume 6 (2014): Issue 39 (November 2014)
Volume 6 (2014): Issue 38 (May 2014)
Volume 5 (2013): Issue 37 (November 2013)
Volume 5 (2013): Issue 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Volume 5 (2013): Issue 35 (May 2013)
Volume 4 (2012): Issue 34 (December 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Issue 33 (November 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Issue 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 31 (November 2011)
Volume 4 (2011): Issue 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volume 4 (2010): Issue 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Volume 3 (2010): Issue 28 (May 2010)
Volume 3 (2009): Issue 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Volume 3 (2009): Issue 26 (May 2009)
Volume 3 (2008): Issue 25 (November 2008)
Volume 2 (2008): Issue 24 (May 2008)
Volume 2 (2007): Issue 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Volume 2 (2007): Issue 22 (May 2007)
Volume 2 (2006): Issue 21 (November 2006)
Volume 1 (2006): Issue 20 (May 2006)
Volume 1 (2005): Issue 19 (November 2005)
Volume 1 (2005): Issue 18 (May 2005)
Volume 1 (2004): Issue 17 (November 2004)
Volume 1 (2004): Issue 16 (May 2004)
Volume 1 (2003): Issue 15 (November 2003)
Volume 1 (2003): Issue 14 (May 2003)
Volume 1 (2002): Issue 13 (November 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Issue 11 (November 2001)
Volume 1 (2002): Issue 11-12 (May 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Issue 10 (May 2001)
Volume 1 (2000): Issue 9 (November 2000)
Volume 1 (2000): Issue 8 (May 2000)
Volume 1 (1999): Issue 7 (November 1999)
Volume 1 (1999): Issue 6 (May 1999)
Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-2 (November 1998) Special Issue: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volume 1 (1998): Issue 5-1 (June 1998) Special Issue: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 131 - 137
Abstract
Abstract
This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 139 - 145
Abstract
Abstract
The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 147 - 171
Abstract
Abstract
Emma Borg has defined semantic minimalism as the thesis that the literal content of well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, fully determined by their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable by language users with no need to access non-linguistic information. The task of this article is threefold. First, I shall raise a criticism to Borg’s minimalism based on how speakers disambiguate homonymy. Second, I will explore some ways Borg might respond to my argument and maintain that none of them offers a conclusive reply to my case. Third, I shall suggest that in order for Borg’s minimalism to best accommodate the problem discussed in this paper, it should allow for semantically incomplete content and be converted into a claim about linguistic competence.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 173 - 197
Abstract
Abstract
Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 199 - 227
Abstract
Abstract
The evolutionary argument is an argument against epiphenomenalism, designed to show that some mind-body theory that allows for the efficacy of qualia is true. First developed by Herbert Spencer and William James, the argument has gone through numerous incarnations and it has been criticized in a number of different ways. Yet many have found the criticisms of the argument in the literature unconvincing. Bearing this in mind, I examine two primary issues: first, whether the alleged insights employed in traditional versions of the argument have been correctly and consistently applied, and second, whether the alleged insights can withstand critical scrutiny. With respect to the first issue, I conclude that the proponents of the argument have tended to grossly oversimplify the considerations involved, incorrectly supposing that the evolutionary argument is properly conceived as a non-specific argument for the disjunction of physicalism and interactionist dualism and against epiphenomenalism. With respect to the second issue, I offer a new criticism that decisively refutes all arguments along the lines of the one I present. Finally, I draw positive lessons about the use of empirical considerations in debates over the mind-body problem.
Published Online: 31 Dec 2018 Page range: 229 - 237
Abstract
Abstract
This paper is a commentary on Joseph Corabi’s “The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument”, this Journal, vol. VI, No. 39; pp. 199-227. It defends William James’s formulation of the evolutionary argument against charges such as mishandling of evidence. Although there are ways of attacking James’s argument, it remains formidable, and Corabi’s suggested revision is not an improvement on James’s statement of it.
This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite.
The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long (2012) argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order theory attempts to specify what purely descriptive property is a fundamental right-making property (FRM). Long contends that the notion that the FRM causally regulates competent use of the predicate ‘right’ leads to a reductio. The failure of this argument is nevertheless instructive concerning a point at which ethics and metaethics overlap.
Emma Borg has defined semantic minimalism as the thesis that the literal content of well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, fully determined by their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable by language users with no need to access non-linguistic information. The task of this article is threefold. First, I shall raise a criticism to Borg’s minimalism based on how speakers disambiguate homonymy. Second, I will explore some ways Borg might respond to my argument and maintain that none of them offers a conclusive reply to my case. Third, I shall suggest that in order for Borg’s minimalism to best accommodate the problem discussed in this paper, it should allow for semantically incomplete content and be converted into a claim about linguistic competence.
Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.
The evolutionary argument is an argument against epiphenomenalism, designed to show that some mind-body theory that allows for the efficacy of qualia is true. First developed by Herbert Spencer and William James, the argument has gone through numerous incarnations and it has been criticized in a number of different ways. Yet many have found the criticisms of the argument in the literature unconvincing. Bearing this in mind, I examine two primary issues: first, whether the alleged insights employed in traditional versions of the argument have been correctly and consistently applied, and second, whether the alleged insights can withstand critical scrutiny. With respect to the first issue, I conclude that the proponents of the argument have tended to grossly oversimplify the considerations involved, incorrectly supposing that the evolutionary argument is properly conceived as a non-specific argument for the disjunction of physicalism and interactionist dualism and against epiphenomenalism. With respect to the second issue, I offer a new criticism that decisively refutes all arguments along the lines of the one I present. Finally, I draw positive lessons about the use of empirical considerations in debates over the mind-body problem.
This paper is a commentary on Joseph Corabi’s “The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument”, this Journal, vol. VI, No. 39; pp. 199-227. It defends William James’s formulation of the evolutionary argument against charges such as mishandling of evidence. Although there are ways of attacking James’s argument, it remains formidable, and Corabi’s suggested revision is not an improvement on James’s statement of it.