Zeitschriften und Ausgaben

Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 55 (December 2019)
Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 54 (December 2019)
Special Heft: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Heft 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Heft 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Heft 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Heft 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Heft 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Heft 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 19 (November 2005)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 18 (May 2005)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 17 (November 2004)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 16 (May 2004)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 14 (May 2003)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 13 (November 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s2 (November 1998)
Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1996): Heft 1 (December 1996)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s1 (June 1998)
Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 61 (November 2021)

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

5 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 71 - 72

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 73 - 94

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Aim of Inquiry

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 95 - 119

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 121 - 141

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 143 - 158

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will
5 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 71 - 72

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 73 - 94

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Aim of Inquiry

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 95 - 119

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 121 - 141

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Online veröffentlicht: 23 Nov 2021
Seitenbereich: 143 - 158

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will

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