Zeszyty czasopisma

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Zeszyts at Their Intersection

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 59 (December 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 57 (November 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 56 (May 2020)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 55 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 54 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 53 (November 2019)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 52 (May 2019)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 50 (December 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 49 (November 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 47 (December 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 46 (November 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 45 (October 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 44 (May 2017)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 43 (November 2016)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 42 (May 2016)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 41 (November 2015)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 40 (May 2015)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 39 (November 2014)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 38 (May 2014)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 37 (November 2013)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 35 (May 2013)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 34 (December 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 33 (November 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 31 (November 2011)

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Tom 4 (2010): Zeszyt 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Tom 3 (2010): Zeszyt 28 (May 2010)

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 26 (May 2009)

Tom 3 (2008): Zeszyt 25 (November 2008)

Tom 2 (2008): Zeszyt 24 (May 2008)

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 22 (May 2007)

Tom 2 (2006): Zeszyt 21 (November 2006)

Tom 1 (2006): Zeszyt 20 (May 2006)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 19 (November 2005)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 18 (May 2005)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 17 (November 2004)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 16 (May 2004)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 15 (November 2003)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 14 (May 2003)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 13 (November 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 11 (November 2001)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 11-12 (May 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 10 (May 2001)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 9 (November 2000)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 8 (May 2000)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 7 (November 1999)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 6 (May 1999)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 4 (May 1998)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 3 (November 1997)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s2 (November 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 2 (May 1997)

Tom 1 (1996): Zeszyt 1 (December 1996)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s1 (June 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

5 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 71 - 72

Abstrakt

Otwarty dostęp

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 73 - 94

Abstrakt

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Otwarty dostęp

The Aim of Inquiry

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 95 - 119

Abstrakt

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Otwarty dostęp

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 121 - 141

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Otwarty dostęp

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 143 - 158

Abstrakt

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will
5 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Editorial: Disputatio’s 25th Anniversary

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 71 - 72

Abstrakt

Otwarty dostęp

Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 73 - 94

Abstrakt

Abstract

The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Analytic philosophy
  • tradition
  • hyperintensional
  • heuristic
  • sorites
Otwarty dostęp

The Aim of Inquiry

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 95 - 119

Abstrakt

Abstract

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Inquiry
  • knowledge
  • belief
  • opinion
  • epistemic improvement
Otwarty dostęp

Metaphysical Nature of Social Groups

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 121 - 141

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features (structural organization of the group) with respect to the significance of concrete features (the group’s members) can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Social groups
  • structuralism
  • metaphysics of groups
  • abstract features
  • concrete features
Otwarty dostęp

Agent Causation Is Not Prior to Event Causation

Data publikacji: 23 Nov 2021
Zakres stron: 143 - 158

Abstrakt

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue against the claim that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation. To accomplish this aim, I shall first briefly discuss the motivation behind agent causation. Second, I shall highlight the differences between agent causation and event causation. Third, I shall begin briefly with the weaker claim held by Timothy O’Connor and Randolph Clarke that there is no good reason to believe that event causation is more fundamental than agent causation. Fourth, I shall discuss the stronger claim held by E. J. Lowe that agent causation is more fundamental than event causation, and raise objections against the various arguments Lowe advances for the stronger claim. To the extent that my objections against Lowe’s stronger claim succeed, they raise questions for O’Connor’s and Clarke’s weaker claim.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Agent
  • Substance
  • Event
  • Causation
  • Free Will

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