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  2. Disputatio
  3. Volume 13 (2021): Issue 60 (May 2021)

Zeszyty

Zeszyty czasopisma

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Disputatio

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 67 (December 2022)

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 66 (December 2022)
Special Zeszyt: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 65 (November 2022)

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 63 (December 2021)
Special Zeszyt on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Zeszyts at Their Intersection

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 59 (December 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 57 (November 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 56 (May 2020)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 55 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 54 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 53 (November 2019)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 52 (May 2019)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 50 (December 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 49 (November 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 47 (December 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 46 (November 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 45 (October 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 44 (May 2017)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 43 (November 2016)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 42 (May 2016)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 41 (November 2015)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 40 (May 2015)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 39 (November 2014)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 38 (May 2014)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 37 (November 2013)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 35 (May 2013)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 34 (December 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 33 (November 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 31 (November 2011)

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Tom 4 (2010): Zeszyt 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Tom 3 (2010): Zeszyt 28 (May 2010)

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 26 (May 2009)

Tom 3 (2008): Zeszyt 25 (November 2008)

Tom 2 (2008): Zeszyt 24 (May 2008)

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 22 (May 2007)

Tom 2 (2006): Zeszyt 21 (November 2006)

Tom 1 (2006): Zeszyt 20 (May 2006)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 19 (November 2005)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 18 (May 2005)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 17 (November 2004)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 16 (May 2004)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 15 (November 2003)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 14 (May 2003)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 13 (November 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 11 (November 2001)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 11-12 (May 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 10 (May 2001)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 9 (November 2000)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 8 (May 2000)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 7 (November 1999)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 6 (May 1999)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 5-1 (June 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 5-2 (November 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 4 (May 1998)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 3 (November 1997)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 2 (May 1997)

Tom 1 (1996): Zeszyt 1 (December 1996)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
01 Dec 1996
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski, Portuguese

Wyszukiwanie

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
01 Dec 1996
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski, Portuguese

Wyszukiwanie

0 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Peter Alward
Peter Alward
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 1 - 25

Abstrakt

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Otwarty dostęp

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Berit Brogaard
Berit Brogaard
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 27 - 50

Abstrakt

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Otwarty dostęp

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Harold Noonan
Harold Noonan
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 51 - 69

Abstrakt

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes
0 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Peter Alward
Peter Alward
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 1 - 25

Abstrakt

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Otwarty dostęp

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Berit Brogaard
Berit Brogaard
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 27 - 50

Abstrakt

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Otwarty dostęp

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Harold Noonan
Harold Noonan
Data publikacji: 17 Jul 2021
Zakres stron: 51 - 69

Abstrakt

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes