Rivista e Edizione

Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 55 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 54 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edizione 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edizione 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edizione 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edizione 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Edizione 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Edizione 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s2 (November 1998)
Special Edizione: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s1 (June 1998)
Special Edizione: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1996): Edizione 1 (December 1996)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

3 Articoli
Accesso libero

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 1 - 25

Astratto

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Parole chiave

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Accesso libero

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 27 - 50

Astratto

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Parole chiave

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Accesso libero

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 51 - 69

Astratto

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Parole chiave

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes
3 Articoli
Accesso libero

Just Kidding: Stand-Up, Speech Acts and Slurs

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 1 - 25

Astratto

Abstract

People respond to moral criticism of their speech by claiming that they were joking. In this paper, I develop a speech act analysis of the humor excuse consisting of a negative stage, in which the speaker denies he or she was making an assertion, and a positive stage, in which the speaker claims she or he was engaged in non-serious/humorous speech instead. This analysis, however, runs afoul of the group identity objection, according to which there is a moral distinction between jokes targeting members of vulnerable groups made by members of those groups and similar jokes made by non-members. In order to avoid this objection, I offer a revision to the speech act analysis that draws upon Perry’s distinction between beliefs and belief-states.

Parole chiave

  • Humor
  • speech acts
  • excuse
  • slurs
  • belief-states
Accesso libero

Practical Identity and Duties of Love

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 27 - 50

Astratto

Abstract

This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show that the proposed account of special relationship duties circumvents two problems facing self-conception accounts of special relationship duties.

Parole chiave

  • Close relationships
  • friendships
  • practical identity
  • romantic love
  • special relationship duties
Accesso libero

Kripke Was Right Even If He Was Wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the Unicorns

Pubblicato online: 17 Jul 2021
Pagine: 51 - 69

Astratto

Abstract

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that “no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.” He adds that he holds similarly that ‘one cannot say of any possible person that he would have been Sherlock Holmes, had he existed.” He notes the “cryptic brevity” of these remarks and refers to a forthcoming work for elaborations—the work being, of course, the John Locke Lectures (2013). Coming as it does at the end of Naming and Necessity, it is natural to read this discussion as drawing out consequences of Kripke’s non-descriptivist picture of proper names and names of natural kinds. In fact, so much is suggested there by Kripke himself. The question thus arises: can the contentious claims quoted from the Addenda be defended independently of Kripke’s rejection of descriptivism? I shall argue that, as appears from the John Locke Lectures, they can be.

Parole chiave

  • Kripke
  • fiction
  • names
  • unicorns
  • Sherlock Holmes

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