Volume 1 (2005): Issue 19 (November 2005)

Dettagli rivista e numero

Dettagli della rivista
Formato: Rivista
eISSN: 2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta: 01 Dec 1996
Periodo di pubblicazione: 4 volte all'anno
Lingue: Inglese, Portuguese

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Articoli

11 Articoli

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: Accesso libero

A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts

Elisabetta Lalumera

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 205 - 221

Astratto

I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.

: Accesso libero

Time travel and the open future

Kristie Miller

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 223 - 232

Astratto

I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.

: Accesso libero

The irreducibility of consciousness

Amy Kind

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 233 - 247

Astratto

In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in the discussion. Clarifying this notion in turn helps to clarify what it means to claim that consciousness is irreducible, and provides insight into the implications that the truth of this claim would have for the dualism-materialism debate. Ultimately, I suggest that the sort of irreducibility that can be motivated by the zombie thought experiment is not sufficient to require the rejection of materialism.

: Accesso libero

Baier and Cottingham on the meaning of life

Thaddeus Metz

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 251 - 264

Astratto

I examine two recent books by analytic philosophers that address the underexplored topic of whether the meaning of life depends on the existence of a supernatural realm including God and a soul. John Cottingham’s On the Meaning of Life defends a supernaturalist conception of life’s meaning, whereas Kurt Baier’s Problems of Life and Death defends the opposite, naturalist perspective. I show that their respective arguments are worth serious consideration, indicate some potential weaknesses in them, and suggest some other argumentative strategies that those interested in this fascinating topic might pursue elsewhere in more depth.