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Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection

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SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

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Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

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Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

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Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

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XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

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Petrus Hispanus 2009

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

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Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 42 (May 2016)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Is Epistemology Tainted?

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 1 - 35

Resumen

Abstract

Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.

Palabras clave

  • Knowledge
  • vagueness
  • relativism
Acceso abierto

Change Blindness and Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 37 - 56

Resumen

Abstract

Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

Palabras clave

  • Consciousness
  • Misrepresentation
  • Higher-order thought
  • Change Blindness
  • HOT
Acceso abierto

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 57 - 92

Resumen

Abstract

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.

Palabras clave

  • Teleosemantics
  • representation
  • intentionality
  • misrepresentation
  • mental content
Acceso abierto

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 93 - 112

Resumen

Abstract

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.

Palabras clave

  • Intentional objects
  • intentionality
  • Tim Crane
  • entity
  • existence
Acceso abierto

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 113 - 124

Resumen

Abstract

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Palabras clave

  • Knowing how
  • practical knowledge
  • intellectualism
  • David Wiggins
  • Aristotle
Acceso abierto

Seeing Things as they are: A Theory of Perception

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 125 - 131

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Semantic Externalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 131 - 137

Resumen

Acceso abierto

On Inequality

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 138 - 145

Resumen

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Is Epistemology Tainted?

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 1 - 35

Resumen

Abstract

Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.

Palabras clave

  • Knowledge
  • vagueness
  • relativism
Acceso abierto

Change Blindness and Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 37 - 56

Resumen

Abstract

Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

Palabras clave

  • Consciousness
  • Misrepresentation
  • Higher-order thought
  • Change Blindness
  • HOT
Acceso abierto

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 57 - 92

Resumen

Abstract

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.

Palabras clave

  • Teleosemantics
  • representation
  • intentionality
  • misrepresentation
  • mental content
Acceso abierto

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 93 - 112

Resumen

Abstract

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.

Palabras clave

  • Intentional objects
  • intentionality
  • Tim Crane
  • entity
  • existence
Acceso abierto

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 113 - 124

Resumen

Abstract

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Palabras clave

  • Knowing how
  • practical knowledge
  • intellectualism
  • David Wiggins
  • Aristotle
Acceso abierto

Seeing Things as they are: A Theory of Perception

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 125 - 131

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Semantic Externalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 131 - 137

Resumen

Acceso abierto

On Inequality

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 138 - 145

Resumen

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