Rivista e Edizione

Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 55 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 54 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edizione 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edizione 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edizione 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edizione 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Edizione 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Edizione 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s2 (November 1998)
Special Edizione: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1996): Edizione 1 (December 1996)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s1 (June 1998)
Special Edizione: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

8 Articoli
Accesso libero

Is Epistemology Tainted?

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 1 - 35

Astratto

Abstract

Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.

Parole chiave

  • Knowledge
  • vagueness
  • relativism
Accesso libero

Change Blindness and Misrepresentation

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 37 - 56

Astratto

Abstract

Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

Parole chiave

  • Consciousness
  • Misrepresentation
  • Higher-order thought
  • Change Blindness
  • HOT
Accesso libero

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 57 - 92

Astratto

Abstract

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.

Parole chiave

  • Teleosemantics
  • representation
  • intentionality
  • misrepresentation
  • mental content
Accesso libero

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 93 - 112

Astratto

Abstract

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.

Parole chiave

  • Intentional objects
  • intentionality
  • Tim Crane
  • entity
  • existence
Accesso libero

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 113 - 124

Astratto

Abstract

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Parole chiave

  • Knowing how
  • practical knowledge
  • intellectualism
  • David Wiggins
  • Aristotle
Accesso libero

Seeing Things as they are: A Theory of Perception

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 125 - 131

Astratto

Accesso libero

Semantic Externalism

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 131 - 137

Astratto

Accesso libero

On Inequality

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 138 - 145

Astratto

8 Articoli
Accesso libero

Is Epistemology Tainted?

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 1 - 35

Astratto

Abstract

Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.

Parole chiave

  • Knowledge
  • vagueness
  • relativism
Accesso libero

Change Blindness and Misrepresentation

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 37 - 56

Astratto

Abstract

Some proponents of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness (CB). CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

Parole chiave

  • Consciousness
  • Misrepresentation
  • Higher-order thought
  • Change Blindness
  • HOT
Accesso libero

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 57 - 92

Astratto

Abstract

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.

Parole chiave

  • Teleosemantics
  • representation
  • intentionality
  • misrepresentation
  • mental content
Accesso libero

What it is to be an Intentional Object

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 93 - 112

Astratto

Abstract

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects” (2001). In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of (partial) overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.

Parole chiave

  • Intentional objects
  • intentionality
  • Tim Crane
  • entity
  • existence
Accesso libero

Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 113 - 124

Astratto

Abstract

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Parole chiave

  • Knowing how
  • practical knowledge
  • intellectualism
  • David Wiggins
  • Aristotle
Accesso libero

Seeing Things as they are: A Theory of Perception

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 125 - 131

Astratto

Accesso libero

Semantic Externalism

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 131 - 137

Astratto

Accesso libero

On Inequality

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 138 - 145

Astratto

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