Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 66 (December 2022) Special Heft: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 65 (November 2022)
Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 64 (May 2022)
Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 63 (December 2021) Special Heft on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Hefts at Their Intersection
Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 61 (November 2021)
Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 60 (May 2021)
Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 59 (December 2020)
Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 57 (November 2020)
Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 56 (May 2020)
Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 55 (December 2019) Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 54 (December 2019) Special Heft: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)
Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 52 (May 2019)
Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 50 (December 2018)
Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 49 (November 2018)
Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 48 (May 2018)
Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 47 (December 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 46 (November 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 45 (October 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 44 (May 2017)
Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)
Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 42 (May 2016)
Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 41 (November 2015)
Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 40 (May 2015)
Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 39 (November 2014)
Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 38 (May 2014)
Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 37 (November 2013)
Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)
Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 34 (December 2012)
Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 33 (November 2012)
Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 31 (November 2011)
Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volumen 4 (2010): Heft 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Volumen 3 (2010): Heft 28 (May 2010)
Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 26 (May 2009)
Volumen 3 (2008): Heft 25 (November 2008)
Volumen 2 (2008): Heft 24 (May 2008)
Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 22 (May 2007)
Volumen 2 (2006): Heft 21 (November 2006)
Volumen 1 (2006): Heft 20 (May 2006)
Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 19 (November 2005)
Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 18 (May 2005)
Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 17 (November 2004)
Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 16 (May 2004)
Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 15 (November 2003)
Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 14 (May 2003)
Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 13 (November 2002)
Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 11 (November 2001)
Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 11-12 (May 2002)
Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 10 (May 2001)
Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 9 (November 2000)
Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 8 (May 2000)
Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 7 (November 1999)
Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 6 (May 1999)
Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 5-1 (June 1998) Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 5-2 (November 1998) Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018 Seitenbereich: 259 - 274
Zusammenfassung
Abstract
The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.
Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018 Seitenbereich: 275 - 291
Zusammenfassung
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.
Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018 Seitenbereich: 293 - 307
Zusammenfassung
Abstract
In the current debate on how ordinary objects persist through time, more than one philosopher has endorsed the following two theses: stage theory and diachronic universalism. In this paper, I would like to offer a solution to the problem (related to lingering properties) that Balashov poses to the joint acceptance of these theses. I will also offer a number of reasons why, even if it is not necessary to undermine Balashov’s counterexamples, stage theorists can, without making their theory less appealing, reject Balashov’s understanding of sorts, which plays a crucial role in his criticisms of stage universalism.
Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018 Seitenbereich: 309 - 315
Zusammenfassung
Abstract
In her study Fiction and Imagination: The Anthropological Function of Literature (2000), Margit Sutrop criticizes Gregory Currie’s theory of fiction-making, as presented in The Nature of Fiction(1990), for using an inappropriate conception of the author’s ‘fictive intention.’ As Sutrop sees it, Currie is mistaken in reducing the author’s fictive intention to that of achieving a certain response in the audience. In this paper, I shall discuss Sutrop’s theory of fiction-making and argue that although her view is insightful in distinguishing the illocutionary effect and the perlocutionary effect in the author’s fictive intention, there are flaws in it. My aim is to show that, first, Sutrop’s critique of Currie’s view is misguided and, second, her own definition of fiction as the author’s expression of her imagination is problematic in not distinguishing literary fiction-making from other discursive functions and in dismissing the literary practice which regulates the production of literary fictions.
The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.
In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.
In the current debate on how ordinary objects persist through time, more than one philosopher has endorsed the following two theses: stage theory and diachronic universalism. In this paper, I would like to offer a solution to the problem (related to lingering properties) that Balashov poses to the joint acceptance of these theses. I will also offer a number of reasons why, even if it is not necessary to undermine Balashov’s counterexamples, stage theorists can, without making their theory less appealing, reject Balashov’s understanding of sorts, which plays a crucial role in his criticisms of stage universalism.
In her study Fiction and Imagination: The Anthropological Function of Literature (2000), Margit Sutrop criticizes Gregory Currie’s theory of fiction-making, as presented in The Nature of Fiction(1990), for using an inappropriate conception of the author’s ‘fictive intention.’ As Sutrop sees it, Currie is mistaken in reducing the author’s fictive intention to that of achieving a certain response in the audience. In this paper, I shall discuss Sutrop’s theory of fiction-making and argue that although her view is insightful in distinguishing the illocutionary effect and the perlocutionary effect in the author’s fictive intention, there are flaws in it. My aim is to show that, first, Sutrop’s critique of Currie’s view is misguided and, second, her own definition of fiction as the author’s expression of her imagination is problematic in not distinguishing literary fiction-making from other discursive functions and in dismissing the literary practice which regulates the production of literary fictions.