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Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 55 (December 2019)
Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 54 (December 2019)
Special Heft: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 49 (November 2018)

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Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 47 (December 2017)

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Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)

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Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 41 (November 2015)

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Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Heft 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Heft 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Heft 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Heft 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Heft 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Heft 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 19 (November 2005)

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Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s2 (November 1998)
Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1996): Heft 1 (December 1996)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s1 (June 1998)
Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

10 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 147 - 171

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Reflective knowledge
  • truth
  • pragmatism
  • meaning
  • sensitivity
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Anti-Realism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 173 - 185

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Anti-realism
  • correspondence-truth
  • comparing
  • Kant
  • realism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Concept of Knowledge: What is It For?

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 187 - 202

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

What is the concept of knowledge for? What does it do for us? This question cannot be severed from considerations about what we do by using it. In this paper, I propose to view the point of our concept of knowledge in terms of a device for acknowledging epistemic authority in a social and normative space in which we share valuable information. It is our way of collectively expressing the acknowledgment we owe to others because of their being creditable when engaged in the task of knowing. By using the concept of knowledge we are not just marking the epistemic positions we occupy, we are also acknowledging epistemic authority and indicating the advisability of taking oneself or others as “ready” for the transmission of authority.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Concept of knowledge
  • certification view
  • credibility
  • epistemic authority
  • acknowledgment
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Pragmatism. Propositional Priority and the Organic Model of Propositional Individuation

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 203 - 217

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

We identify two senses of ‘pragmatics’ and related terms that give rise to two different methods of propositional individuation. The first one is the contextualist approach that essentially acknowledges contextual information to take part in the determination of what is said by the utterance of a sentence. In this sense, Pragmatics relies on the Principle of Compositionality and interprets propositions as structured entities. It epitomises the Building-block Model of Propositional Individuation. The general approach that makes what the agents do the grounding level of philosophical and linguistic analysis characterizes the second sense, Pragmatism. It finds its clearest expression in Peirce’s Pragmatist Maxim, and it relies on (a particular interpretation of) the Fregean Principle of Context, and supports a view of propositions as unstructured entities. This is the Organic Model of Propositional Individuation. There is a test, the Analytic Equivalence Test, that tells apart the two models. According to it, the answer to the question whether a theory makes room for different but analytically equivalent propositions determines the model the theory belongs in. A positive answer classifies the theory as belonging to the building-block model; a negative answer allocates the theory within the organic model.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Building-block model
  • compositionality
  • expressivism
  • Frege
  • relativism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 219 - 232

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Pragmatism
  • inferentialism
  • defeasible reasoning
  • particularism
  • occasion-sensitivity
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 233 - 252

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Epistemic rationality
  • practical rationality
  • virtue epistemology
  • pragmatic encroachment
  • agent reliabilism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 253 - 267

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Rejectivism
  • denial
  • negation
  • contradictions
  • law of non-contradiction
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 269 - 293

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement ‘a is b’ says that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating identity statements as sui generis instead of attempting to explain them by means of the idea that they ascribe a relation. My contention is that once we do this, no analysis is required.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Identity statements
  • informative identities
  • numerical identity
  • names
  • Frege
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 295 - 302

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 302 - 309

Zusammenfassung

10 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 147 - 171

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Reflective knowledge
  • truth
  • pragmatism
  • meaning
  • sensitivity
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Anti-Realism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 173 - 185

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Anti-realism
  • correspondence-truth
  • comparing
  • Kant
  • realism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Concept of Knowledge: What is It For?

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 187 - 202

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

What is the concept of knowledge for? What does it do for us? This question cannot be severed from considerations about what we do by using it. In this paper, I propose to view the point of our concept of knowledge in terms of a device for acknowledging epistemic authority in a social and normative space in which we share valuable information. It is our way of collectively expressing the acknowledgment we owe to others because of their being creditable when engaged in the task of knowing. By using the concept of knowledge we are not just marking the epistemic positions we occupy, we are also acknowledging epistemic authority and indicating the advisability of taking oneself or others as “ready” for the transmission of authority.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Concept of knowledge
  • certification view
  • credibility
  • epistemic authority
  • acknowledgment
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Pragmatism. Propositional Priority and the Organic Model of Propositional Individuation

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 203 - 217

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

We identify two senses of ‘pragmatics’ and related terms that give rise to two different methods of propositional individuation. The first one is the contextualist approach that essentially acknowledges contextual information to take part in the determination of what is said by the utterance of a sentence. In this sense, Pragmatics relies on the Principle of Compositionality and interprets propositions as structured entities. It epitomises the Building-block Model of Propositional Individuation. The general approach that makes what the agents do the grounding level of philosophical and linguistic analysis characterizes the second sense, Pragmatism. It finds its clearest expression in Peirce’s Pragmatist Maxim, and it relies on (a particular interpretation of) the Fregean Principle of Context, and supports a view of propositions as unstructured entities. This is the Organic Model of Propositional Individuation. There is a test, the Analytic Equivalence Test, that tells apart the two models. According to it, the answer to the question whether a theory makes room for different but analytically equivalent propositions determines the model the theory belongs in. A positive answer classifies the theory as belonging to the building-block model; a negative answer allocates the theory within the organic model.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Building-block model
  • compositionality
  • expressivism
  • Frege
  • relativism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 219 - 232

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Pragmatism
  • inferentialism
  • defeasible reasoning
  • particularism
  • occasion-sensitivity
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Acting in Order to Know, Knowing in Order to Act: Sosa on Epistemic and Practical Deliberation

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 233 - 252

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency (2015), the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Epistemic rationality
  • practical rationality
  • virtue epistemology
  • pragmatic encroachment
  • agent reliabilism
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 253 - 267

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Rejectivism
  • denial
  • negation
  • contradictions
  • law of non-contradiction
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On Identity Statements: In Defense of a Sui Generis View

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 269 - 293

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

This paper is about the meaning and function of identity statements involving proper names. There are two prominent views on this topic, according to which identity statements ascribe a relation: the object-view, on which identity statements ascribe a relation borne by all objects to themselves, and the name-view, on which an identity statement ‘a is b’ says that the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ codesignate. The object- and name-views may seem to exhaust the field. I make a case for treating identity statements as sui generis instead of attempting to explain them by means of the idea that they ascribe a relation. My contention is that once we do this, no analysis is required.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Identity statements
  • informative identities
  • numerical identity
  • names
  • Frege
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 295 - 302

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 302 - 309

Zusammenfassung

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