Zeitschriften und Ausgaben

Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Hefts at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 55 (December 2019)
Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 54 (December 2019)
Special Heft: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Heft 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Heft 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Heft 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Heft 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Heft 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Heft 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 19 (November 2005)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 18 (May 2005)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 17 (November 2004)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 16 (May 2004)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 14 (May 2003)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 13 (November 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s2 (November 1998)
Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1996): Heft 1 (December 1996)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s1 (June 1998)
Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 48 (May 2018)

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

3 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 1 - 42

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 43 - 55

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 57 - 70

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics
3 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 1 - 42

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 43 - 55

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Online veröffentlicht: 03 Jan 2019
Seitenbereich: 57 - 70

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics

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