Zeitschriften und Ausgaben

Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 65 (November 2022)

Volumen 14 (2022): Heft 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Hefts at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Heft 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Heft 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 55 (December 2019)
Special Heft: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 54 (December 2019)
Special Heft: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Heft 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Heft 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Heft 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Heft 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Heft 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Heft 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Heft 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Heft 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Heft 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Heft 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Heft 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Heft 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Heft 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Heft 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Heft 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Heft 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 19 (November 2005)

Volumen 1 (2005): Heft 18 (May 2005)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 17 (November 2004)

Volumen 1 (2004): Heft 16 (May 2004)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Heft 14 (May 2003)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 13 (November 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Heft 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Heft 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Heft 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Heft 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1997): Heft 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s2 (November 1998)
Special Heft: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1998): Heft s1 (June 1998)
Special Heft: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1996): Heft 1 (December 1996)

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

Volumen 4 (2011): Heft 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Zeitschriftendaten
Format
Zeitschrift
eISSN
2182-2875
Erstveröffentlichung
16 Apr 2017
Erscheinungsweise
4 Hefte pro Jahr
Sprachen
Englisch

Suche

8 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editor’s Introduction

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 103 - 105

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Do honeybees have concepts?

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 107 - 125

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 127 - 149

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 151 - 169

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 171 - 193

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 195 - 199

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 199 - 204

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 204 - 213

Zusammenfassung

8 Artikel
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Editor’s Introduction

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 103 - 105

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Do honeybees have concepts?

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 107 - 125

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 127 - 149

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 151 - 169

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 171 - 193

Zusammenfassung

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Schlüsselwörter

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Uneingeschränkter Zugang

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 195 - 199

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 199 - 204

Zusammenfassung

Uneingeschränkter Zugang

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Online veröffentlicht: 31 Dec 2018
Seitenbereich: 204 - 213

Zusammenfassung

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