Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 66 (December 2022) Special Zeszyt: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 65 (November 2022)
Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)
Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 63 (December 2021) Special Zeszyt on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Zeszyts at Their Intersection
Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)
Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)
Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 59 (December 2020)
Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 57 (November 2020)
Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 56 (May 2020)
Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 55 (December 2019) Special Zeszyt: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 54 (December 2019) Special Zeszyt: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 53 (November 2019)
Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 52 (May 2019)
Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 50 (December 2018)
Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 49 (November 2018)
Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)
Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 47 (December 2017)
Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 46 (November 2017)
Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 45 (October 2017)
Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 44 (May 2017)
Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 43 (November 2016)
Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 42 (May 2016)
Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 41 (November 2015)
Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 40 (May 2015)
Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 39 (November 2014)
Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 38 (May 2014)
Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 37 (November 2013)
Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 35 (May 2013)
Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 34 (December 2012)
Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 33 (November 2012)
Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 31 (November 2011)
Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Tom 4 (2010): Zeszyt 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Tom 3 (2010): Zeszyt 28 (May 2010)
Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 26 (May 2009)
Tom 3 (2008): Zeszyt 25 (November 2008)
Tom 2 (2008): Zeszyt 24 (May 2008)
Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 22 (May 2007)
Tom 2 (2006): Zeszyt 21 (November 2006)
Tom 1 (2006): Zeszyt 20 (May 2006)
Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 19 (November 2005)
Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 18 (May 2005)
Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 17 (November 2004)
Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 16 (May 2004)
Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 15 (November 2003)
Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 14 (May 2003)
Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 13 (November 2002)
Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 11 (November 2001)
Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 11-12 (May 2002)
Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 10 (May 2001)
Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 9 (November 2000)
Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 8 (May 2000)
Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 7 (November 1999)
Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 6 (May 1999)
Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 5-1 (June 1998) Special Zeszyt: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 5-2 (November 1998) Special Zeszyt: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 4 (May 1998)
Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 3 (November 1997)
Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 2 (May 1997)
Tom 1 (1996): Zeszyt 1 (December 1996)
Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
01 Dec 1996
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski, Portuguese
Wyszukiwanie
Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Data publikacji: 31 Dec 2018 Zakres stron: 171 - 183
Abstrakt
Abstract
Embora algumas posições filosóficas de Gödel sejam bem conhecidas, como o platonismo, a sua teoria do conhecimento é, em comparação, menos divulgada. A partir do «Problema da Evidência» de Hilbert-Bernays, I, pg. 20 seq., apresento a seguir os traços essenciais da posição de Gödel sobre a caracterização epistemológica da evidência finitista, com especial relevo para a história dos conceitos utilizados.
Embora algumas posições filosóficas de Gödel sejam bem conhecidas, como o platonismo, a sua teoria do conhecimento é, em comparação, menos divulgada. A partir do «Problema da Evidência» de Hilbert-Bernays, I, pg. 20 seq., apresento a seguir os traços essenciais da posição de Gödel sobre a caracterização epistemológica da evidência finitista, com especial relevo para a história dos conceitos utilizados.