- Informacje o czasopiśmie
- Format
- Czasopismo
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- Pierwsze wydanie
- 16 Apr 2017
- Częstotliwość wydawania
- 4 razy w roku
- Języki
- Angielski
Wyszukiwanie
Abstrakt
If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27, that is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing.
- Otwarty dostęp
Dispensing with Ontological Levels: an Illustration
Zakres stron: 25 - 43
Abstrakt
Abstrakt
The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections.
Słowa kluczowe
- Olfaction
- olfactory experience
- representationalism
- subjectivism
Abstrakt
In this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular disputes do not. I apply this criterion in arguing that certain ontological disputes matter; specifically, the disputes over concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects. Finally, I consider how one could show that some ontological disputes do not matter, using a Platonism/nominalism dispute as an example.
Słowa kluczowe
- Ontology
- metaontology
- possible worlds
- coincidence
- platonism and nominalism
- Otwarty dostęp
Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative Attitudes? Critical Review of Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction
Zakres stron: 93 - 106
Abstrakt
Deonna and Teroni’s
Słowa kluczowe
- Emotion
- embodiment
- evaluation
- correctness
- justification
Abstrakt
Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.
Słowa kluczowe
- Zombies
- conceivability
- imagination
- first-person perspective
- third-person perspective
- Otwarty dostęp
Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Zakres stron: 117 - 122