Zeszyty czasopisma

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 65 (November 2022)

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Zeszyts at Their Intersection

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 59 (December 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 57 (November 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 56 (May 2020)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 55 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 54 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 53 (November 2019)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 52 (May 2019)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 50 (December 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 49 (November 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 47 (December 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 46 (November 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 45 (October 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 44 (May 2017)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 43 (November 2016)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 42 (May 2016)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 41 (November 2015)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 40 (May 2015)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 39 (November 2014)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 38 (May 2014)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 37 (November 2013)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 35 (May 2013)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 34 (December 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 33 (November 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 31 (November 2011)

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Tom 4 (2010): Zeszyt 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Tom 3 (2010): Zeszyt 28 (May 2010)

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 26 (May 2009)

Tom 3 (2008): Zeszyt 25 (November 2008)

Tom 2 (2008): Zeszyt 24 (May 2008)

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 22 (May 2007)

Tom 2 (2006): Zeszyt 21 (November 2006)

Tom 1 (2006): Zeszyt 20 (May 2006)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 19 (November 2005)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 18 (May 2005)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 17 (November 2004)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 16 (May 2004)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 15 (November 2003)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 14 (May 2003)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 13 (November 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 11 (November 2001)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 11-12 (May 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 10 (May 2001)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 9 (November 2000)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 8 (May 2000)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 7 (November 1999)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 6 (May 1999)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 4 (May 1998)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 3 (November 1997)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 2 (May 1997)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s2 (November 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s1 (June 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1996): Zeszyt 1 (December 1996)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

4 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 1 - 26

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Dispositional essentialism
  • laws of nature
  • necessary connections
  • problem of induction
Otwarty dostęp

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 27 - 40

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Assertion
  • constitutive norms
  • philosophy of language
  • rule-breaking
  • Timothy Williamson
Otwarty dostęp

Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 41 - 49

Abstrakt

Abstract

We will formulate some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox and assess the generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox to these paradoxes: the textbook approach and that of Bays (2000). We argue that the textbook approach to handle Skolem’s paradox cannot be generalized to solve the parallel higher-order paradoxes, unless it is augmented by the claim that there is no unique language within which the practice of mathematics can be formalized. Then, we argue that Bays’ solution to the original Skolem’s paradox, unlike the textbook solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.

Słowa kluczowe

  • First-order logic
  • Löwenheim number
  • mathematical practice
  • second-order logic
  • Skolem’s paradox
Otwarty dostęp

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 51 - 63

Abstrakt

Abstract

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Classical first-order logic
  • discrete plurality
  • singular logic
  • solid plural logic
  • solid plurality
4 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 1 - 26

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Dispositional essentialism
  • laws of nature
  • necessary connections
  • problem of induction
Otwarty dostęp

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 27 - 40

Abstrakt

Abstract

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Assertion
  • constitutive norms
  • philosophy of language
  • rule-breaking
  • Timothy Williamson
Otwarty dostęp

Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 41 - 49

Abstrakt

Abstract

We will formulate some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox and assess the generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox to these paradoxes: the textbook approach and that of Bays (2000). We argue that the textbook approach to handle Skolem’s paradox cannot be generalized to solve the parallel higher-order paradoxes, unless it is augmented by the claim that there is no unique language within which the practice of mathematics can be formalized. Then, we argue that Bays’ solution to the original Skolem’s paradox, unlike the textbook solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.

Słowa kluczowe

  • First-order logic
  • Löwenheim number
  • mathematical practice
  • second-order logic
  • Skolem’s paradox
Otwarty dostęp

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)

Data publikacji: 29 Aug 2022
Zakres stron: 51 - 63

Abstrakt

Abstract

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Classical first-order logic
  • discrete plurality
  • singular logic
  • solid plural logic
  • solid plurality

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