Zeszyty czasopisma

Tom 14 (2022): Zeszyt 64 (May 2022)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 61 (November 2021)

Tom 13 (2021): Zeszyt 60 (May 2021)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 59 (December 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 57 (November 2020)

Tom 12 (2020): Zeszyt 56 (May 2020)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 55 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 54 (December 2019)
Special Zeszyt: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 53 (November 2019)

Tom 11 (2019): Zeszyt 52 (May 2019)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 50 (December 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 49 (November 2018)

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 47 (December 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 46 (November 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 45 (October 2017)

Tom 9 (2017): Zeszyt 44 (May 2017)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 43 (November 2016)

Tom 8 (2016): Zeszyt 42 (May 2016)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 41 (November 2015)

Tom 7 (2015): Zeszyt 40 (May 2015)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 39 (November 2014)

Tom 6 (2014): Zeszyt 38 (May 2014)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 37 (November 2013)

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Tom 5 (2013): Zeszyt 35 (May 2013)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 34 (December 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 33 (November 2012)

Tom 4 (2012): Zeszyt 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 31 (November 2011)

Tom 4 (2011): Zeszyt 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Tom 4 (2010): Zeszyt 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Tom 3 (2010): Zeszyt 28 (May 2010)

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Tom 3 (2009): Zeszyt 26 (May 2009)

Tom 3 (2008): Zeszyt 25 (November 2008)

Tom 2 (2008): Zeszyt 24 (May 2008)

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Tom 2 (2007): Zeszyt 22 (May 2007)

Tom 2 (2006): Zeszyt 21 (November 2006)

Tom 1 (2006): Zeszyt 20 (May 2006)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 19 (November 2005)

Tom 1 (2005): Zeszyt 18 (May 2005)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 17 (November 2004)

Tom 1 (2004): Zeszyt 16 (May 2004)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 15 (November 2003)

Tom 1 (2003): Zeszyt 14 (May 2003)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 13 (November 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 11 (November 2001)

Tom 1 (2002): Zeszyt 11-12 (May 2002)

Tom 1 (2001): Zeszyt 10 (May 2001)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 9 (November 2000)

Tom 1 (2000): Zeszyt 8 (May 2000)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 7 (November 1999)

Tom 1 (1999): Zeszyt 6 (May 1999)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt 4 (May 1998)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 3 (November 1997)

Tom 1 (1997): Zeszyt 2 (May 1997)

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s2 (November 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1998): Zeszyt s1 (June 1998)
Special Zeszyt: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Tom 1 (1996): Zeszyt 1 (December 1996)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

Tom 10 (2018): Zeszyt 48 (May 2018)

Informacje o czasopiśmie
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2182-2875
Pierwsze wydanie
16 Apr 2017
Częstotliwość wydawania
4 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

Wyszukiwanie

3 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 1 - 42

Abstrakt

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Otwarty dostęp

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 43 - 55

Abstrakt

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Otwarty dostęp

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 57 - 70

Abstrakt

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics
3 Artykułów
Otwarty dostęp

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 1 - 42

Abstrakt

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Otwarty dostęp

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 43 - 55

Abstrakt

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Otwarty dostęp

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Data publikacji: 03 Jan 2019
Zakres stron: 57 - 70

Abstrakt

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Słowa kluczowe

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics

Zaplanuj zdalną konferencję ze Sciendo