- Dettagli della rivista
- Formato
- Rivista
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- Pubblicato per la prima volta
- 01 Dec 1996
- Periodo di pubblicazione
- 4 volte all'anno
- Lingue
- Inglese, Portuguese
Cerca
- Accesso libero
The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past
Pagine: 137 - 165
Astratto
I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, it will still be true that The Dynamic Theory entails that
Parole chiave
- Time travel
- Dynamic Theory of Time
- Static Theory of Time
- backward causation
- presentism
Astratto
This work offers a challenge to the orthodox view that descriptive rules are non-normative and passive in their role and usage. It does so by arguing that, although lacking in normativity themselves, descriptive rules can be sources of normativity by way of the normative attitudes that can develop around them. That is, although descriptive rules typically depict how things are, they can also play a role in how things ought to be. In this way, the limited role that this type of rule can play as either a basis for the development of normative reasons, or as explanatory reasons for action is identified and clarified. One desirable outcome of the analysis is a more complete view of what descriptive rules are and how they are utilized by agents.
Parole chiave
- Descriptive rules
- normativity
- expectations
- rules
- reasons
- Accesso libero
Simply Finding Answers, or the Entirety of Inquiry While Standing on One Foot
Pagine: 181 - 198
Astratto
I argue that inquiry can be defined without reference to the attitudes inquirers have during inquiry. Inquiry can instead be defined by its aim: it is the activity that has the aim of answering a question. I call this approach to defining inquiry a “naive” account. I present the naive account of inquiry in contrast to a prominent contemporary account of inquiry most notably defended by Jane Friedman. According to this view of inquiry, which I call an attitude-centric view, inquiry is appropriately defined not by the aim of the activity but by the attitudes that inquirers have during inquiry. After developing the naive view, I defend it against the objection that it collapses into the attitude-centric view.
Parole chiave
- Inquiry
- interrogative attitude
- suspended judgement
- question
- Friedman