Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 66 (December 2022) Special Edizione: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 65 (November 2022)
Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 64 (May 2022)
Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 63 (December 2021) Special Edizione on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Ediziones at Their Intersection
Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 61 (November 2021)
Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)
Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 59 (December 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 57 (November 2020)
Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 56 (May 2020)
Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 55 (December 2019) Special Edizione: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 54 (December 2019) Special Edizione: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 53 (November 2019)
Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 52 (May 2019)
Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 50 (December 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 49 (November 2018)
Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)
Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 47 (December 2017)
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Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 45 (October 2017)
Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 44 (May 2017)
Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 43 (November 2016)
Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)
Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 41 (November 2015)
Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 40 (May 2015)
Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 39 (November 2014)
Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 38 (May 2014)
Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 37 (November 2013)
Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 35 (May 2013)
Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 34 (December 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 33 (November 2012)
Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 31 (November 2011)
Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volume 4 (2010): Edizione 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Volume 3 (2010): Edizione 28 (May 2010)
Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 26 (May 2009)
Volume 3 (2008): Edizione 25 (November 2008)
Volume 2 (2008): Edizione 24 (May 2008)
Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 22 (May 2007)
Volume 2 (2006): Edizione 21 (November 2006)
Volume 1 (2006): Edizione 20 (May 2006)
Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 19 (November 2005)
Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 18 (May 2005)
Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 17 (November 2004)
Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 16 (May 2004)
Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 15 (November 2003)
Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 14 (May 2003)
Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 13 (November 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 11 (November 2001)
Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 11-12 (May 2002)
Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 10 (May 2001)
Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 9 (November 2000)
Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 8 (May 2000)
Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 7 (November 1999)
Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 6 (May 1999)
Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 5-1 (June 1998) Special Edizione: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 5-2 (November 1998) Special Edizione: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
The paper aims at meeting Blackburn’s challenge (1971, 1984, 1985) to explain the non-reductive supervenience of moral predicates on natural ones. It offers a critical examination of Hare’s model of moral thinking (1981) which can be used as a candidate for such an explanation. It is argued that, as it stands, Hare’s model fails to meet Blackburn’s challenge. Yet some revisions of the model are suggested, and it is claimed that the improved version does supply the required explanation. The model suggested in the paper carries a meta-ethical implication concerning the superiority of the anti-realist understanding of moral discourse.
The paper aims at meeting Blackburn’s challenge (1971, 1984, 1985) to explain the non-reductive supervenience of moral predicates on natural ones. It offers a critical examination of Hare’s model of moral thinking (1981) which can be used as a candidate for such an explanation. It is argued that, as it stands, Hare’s model fails to meet Blackburn’s challenge. Yet some revisions of the model are suggested, and it is claimed that the improved version does supply the required explanation. The model suggested in the paper carries a meta-ethical implication concerning the superiority of the anti-realist understanding of moral discourse.