Rivista e Edizione

Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 55 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 54 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edizione 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edizione 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edizione 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edizione 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Edizione 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Edizione 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s2 (November 1998)
Special Edizione: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s1 (June 1998)
Special Edizione: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1996): Edizione 1 (December 1996)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

3 Articoli
Accesso libero

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 1 - 42

Astratto

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Parole chiave

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Accesso libero

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 43 - 55

Astratto

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Parole chiave

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Accesso libero

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 57 - 70

Astratto

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Parole chiave

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics
3 Articoli
Accesso libero

Can the Unconscious Image Save “No Overflow”?

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 1 - 42

Astratto

Abstract

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection.

Parole chiave

  • Consciousness
  • imagery
  • overflow
  • unconscious
  • access
Accesso libero

A Dilemma for Saulish Skepticism: Either Self-Defeating or Not Even Skepticism

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 43 - 55

Astratto

Abstract

Jennifer Saul argues that the evidence from the literature on implicit biases entails a form of skepticism. In this paper, I argue that Saul faces a dilemma: her argument is either self-defeating, or it does not yield a skeptical conclusion. For Saul, both results are unacceptable; thus, her argument fails.

Parole chiave

  • Saul
  • skepticism
  • implicit-bias
  • self-defeat
  • rationality
Accesso libero

Famine, Affluence and Intuitions: Evolutionary Debunking Proves Too Much

Pubblicato online: 03 Jan 2019
Pagine: 57 - 70

Astratto

Abstract

Moral theorists like Singer (2005) and Greene (2014) argue that we should discount intuitions about ‘up-close-and-personal’ moral dilemmas because they are more likely than intuitions about ‘impersonal’ dilemmas to be artifacts of evolution. But by that reasoning, it seems we should ignore the evolved, ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuition to save a drowning child in light of the too-new-to-be-evolved, ‘impersonal’ intuition that we need not donate to international famine relief (contra Singer 1972; Greene 2008). This conclusion seems mistaken and horrifying, yet it cannot be the case both that ‘up-close-and-personal’ intuitions are more reliable than ‘impersonal’ intuitions, and vice versa. Thus, Singer’s (2005) evolutionary debunking argument proves too much, and should not be taken seriously. However, Singer’s debunking argument is typical of an entire class of arguments that seeks to debunk normative principles by reference to evolution. This entire class of argument, I argue, therefore also proves too much to be taken seriously.

Parole chiave

  • Debunking
  • evolutionary psychology
  • metaethics
  • moral psychology
  • normative ethics

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