Rivista e Edizione

Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 65 (November 2022)

Volume 14 (2022): Edizione 64 (May 2022)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Ediziones at Their Intersection

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 61 (November 2021)

Volume 13 (2021): Edizione 60 (May 2021)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 59 (December 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 57 (November 2020)

Volume 12 (2020): Edizione 56 (May 2020)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 55 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 54 (December 2019)
Special Edizione: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 53 (November 2019)

Volume 11 (2019): Edizione 52 (May 2019)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 50 (December 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 49 (November 2018)

Volume 10 (2018): Edizione 48 (May 2018)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 47 (December 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 46 (November 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 45 (October 2017)

Volume 9 (2017): Edizione 44 (May 2017)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 43 (November 2016)

Volume 8 (2016): Edizione 42 (May 2016)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 41 (November 2015)

Volume 7 (2015): Edizione 40 (May 2015)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 39 (November 2014)

Volume 6 (2014): Edizione 38 (May 2014)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 37 (November 2013)

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volume 5 (2013): Edizione 35 (May 2013)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 34 (December 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 33 (November 2012)

Volume 4 (2012): Edizione 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 31 (November 2011)

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volume 4 (2010): Edizione 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volume 3 (2010): Edizione 28 (May 2010)

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volume 3 (2009): Edizione 26 (May 2009)

Volume 3 (2008): Edizione 25 (November 2008)

Volume 2 (2008): Edizione 24 (May 2008)

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volume 2 (2007): Edizione 22 (May 2007)

Volume 2 (2006): Edizione 21 (November 2006)

Volume 1 (2006): Edizione 20 (May 2006)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 19 (November 2005)

Volume 1 (2005): Edizione 18 (May 2005)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 17 (November 2004)

Volume 1 (2004): Edizione 16 (May 2004)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 15 (November 2003)

Volume 1 (2003): Edizione 14 (May 2003)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 13 (November 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 11 (November 2001)

Volume 1 (2002): Edizione 11-12 (May 2002)

Volume 1 (2001): Edizione 10 (May 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 9 (November 2000)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 8 (May 2000)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 7 (November 1999)

Volume 1 (1999): Edizione 6 (May 1999)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione 4 (May 1998)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 3 (November 1997)

Volume 1 (1997): Edizione 2 (May 1997)

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s2 (November 1998)
Special Edizione: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1998): Edizione s1 (June 1998)
Special Edizione: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volume 1 (1996): Edizione 1 (December 1996)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

Volume 4 (2011): Edizione 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2182-2875
Pubblicato per la prima volta
16 Apr 2017
Periodo di pubblicazione
4 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

8 Articoli
Accesso libero

Editor’s Introduction

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 103 - 105

Astratto

Accesso libero

Do honeybees have concepts?

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 107 - 125

Astratto

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Parole chiave

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Accesso libero

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 127 - 149

Astratto

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Parole chiave

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Accesso libero

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 151 - 169

Astratto

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Parole chiave

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Accesso libero

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 171 - 193

Astratto

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Parole chiave

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Accesso libero

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 195 - 199

Astratto

Accesso libero

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 199 - 204

Astratto

Accesso libero

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 204 - 213

Astratto

8 Articoli
Accesso libero

Editor’s Introduction

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 103 - 105

Astratto

Accesso libero

Do honeybees have concepts?

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 107 - 125

Astratto

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Parole chiave

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Accesso libero

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 127 - 149

Astratto

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Parole chiave

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Accesso libero

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 151 - 169

Astratto

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Parole chiave

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Accesso libero

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 171 - 193

Astratto

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Parole chiave

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Accesso libero

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 195 - 199

Astratto

Accesso libero

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 199 - 204

Astratto

Accesso libero

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Pubblicato online: 31 Dec 2018
Pagine: 204 - 213

Astratto

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