- Dettagli della rivista
- Formato
- Rivista
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- Pubblicato per la prima volta
- 16 Apr 2017
- Periodo di pubblicazione
- 4 volte all'anno
- Lingue
- Inglese
Cerca
Astratto
Astratto
Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (
Parole chiave
- Animal cognition
- concepts
- modularity
- concept individuation
- generality constraint
- Accesso libero
Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle
Pagine: 127 - 149
Astratto
Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.
Parole chiave
- Inescapable clashes
- counterfactuals
- Lewis-Stalnaker
- possible worlds
- semantic underdetermination
- Accesso libero
On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III
Pagine: 151 - 169
Astratto
The purpose of the third section of Kant’s
Parole chiave
- Kant
- transcendental deduction
- moral law
- categorical imperative
- Accesso libero
Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought
Pagine: 171 - 193
Astratto
I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.
Parole chiave
- Visual Experience
- Demonstrative Thought
- Common-factor
- Intentionalism
- Paul Snowdon
- Accesso libero
The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness
Pagine: 195 - 199
Astratto
- Accesso libero
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
Pagine: 199 - 204
Astratto
- Accesso libero
Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories
Pagine: 204 - 213