- Dettagli della rivista
- Formato
- Rivista
- eISSN
- 2182-2875
- Pubblicato per la prima volta
- 01 Dec 1996
- Periodo di pubblicazione
- 4 volte all'anno
- Lingue
- Inglese, Portuguese
Cerca
Astratto
If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 27, that is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing.
- Accesso libero
Dispensing with Ontological Levels: an Illustration
Pagine: 25 - 43
Astratto
Astratto
The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections.
Parole chiave
- Olfaction
- olfactory experience
- representationalism
- subjectivism
Astratto
In this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular disputes do not. I apply this criterion in arguing that certain ontological disputes matter; specifically, the disputes over concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects. Finally, I consider how one could show that some ontological disputes do not matter, using a Platonism/nominalism dispute as an example.
Parole chiave
- Ontology
- metaontology
- possible worlds
- coincidence
- platonism and nominalism
- Accesso libero
Are Emotions Embodied Evaluative Attitudes? Critical Review of Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction
Pagine: 93 - 106
Astratto
Deonna and Teroni’s
Parole chiave
- Emotion
- embodiment
- evaluation
- correctness
- justification
Astratto
Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.
Parole chiave
- Zombies
- conceivability
- imagination
- first-person perspective
- third-person perspective
- Accesso libero
Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Pagine: 117 - 122