Revista y Edición

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 65 (November 2022)

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 55 (December 2019)
Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 54 (December 2019)
Special Edición: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Edición 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Edición 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Edición 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Edición 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Edición 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Edición 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 19 (November 2005)

Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 18 (May 2005)

Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 17 (November 2004)

Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 16 (May 2004)

Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 14 (May 2003)

Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 13 (November 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s2 (November 1998)
Special Edición: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s1 (June 1998)
Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1996): Edición 1 (December 1996)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Editor’s Introduction

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 103 - 105

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Do honeybees have concepts?

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 107 - 125

Resumen

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Palabras clave

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Acceso abierto

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 127 - 149

Resumen

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Palabras clave

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Acceso abierto

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 151 - 169

Resumen

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Palabras clave

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Acceso abierto

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 171 - 193

Resumen

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Palabras clave

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Acceso abierto

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 195 - 199

Resumen

Acceso abierto

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 199 - 204

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 204 - 213

Resumen

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Editor’s Introduction

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 103 - 105

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Do honeybees have concepts?

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 107 - 125

Resumen

Abstract

Can animals think? In this paper I address the proposal that many animals, including insects such as honeybees, have genuine thoughts. I consider one prominent version of this view (Carruthers 2004; 2006) that claims that honeybees can represent and process information about their environments in a way that satisfies the main hallmarks of human conceptual thought. I shall argue, however, that this view fails to provide convincing grounds for accepting that animals possess concepts. More precisely, I suggest that two important aspects of conceptual thought, viz., concept individuation and the generality constraint, are not satisfied.

Palabras clave

  • Animal cognition
  • concepts
  • modularity
  • concept individuation
  • generality constraint
Acceso abierto

Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 127 - 149

Resumen

Abstract

Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.

Palabras clave

  • Inescapable clashes
  • counterfactuals
  • Lewis-Stalnaker
  • possible worlds
  • semantic underdetermination
Acceso abierto

On the transcendental deduction in Kant’s Groundwork III

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 151 - 169

Resumen

Abstract

The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’ (1785: 445). Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’ (1785: 440). Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to (1) show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; (2) show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; (3) present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and (4) show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself.

Palabras clave

  • Kant
  • transcendental deduction
  • moral law
  • categorical imperative
Acceso abierto

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 171 - 193

Resumen

Abstract

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Palabras clave

  • Visual Experience
  • Demonstrative Thought
  • Common-factor
  • Intentionalism
  • Paul Snowdon
Acceso abierto

The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 195 - 199

Resumen

Acceso abierto

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 199 - 204

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 204 - 213

Resumen

Planifique su conferencia remota con Sciendo