Revista y Edición

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 65 (November 2022)

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 55 (December 2019)
Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 54 (December 2019)
Special Edición: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Edición 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Edición 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Edición 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Edición 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Edición 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Edición 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 19 (November 2005)

Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 18 (May 2005)

Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 17 (November 2004)

Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 16 (May 2004)

Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 14 (May 2003)

Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 13 (November 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s2 (November 1998)
Special Edición: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s1 (June 1998)
Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1996): Edición 1 (December 1996)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

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Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

4 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 1 - 26

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences.

Palabras clave

  • Dispositional essentialism
  • laws of nature
  • necessary connections
  • problem of induction
Acceso abierto

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 27 - 40

Resumen

Abstract

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.

Palabras clave

  • Assertion
  • constitutive norms
  • philosophy of language
  • rule-breaking
  • Timothy Williamson
Acceso abierto

Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 41 - 49

Resumen

Abstract

We will formulate some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox and assess the generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox to these paradoxes: the textbook approach and that of Bays (2000). We argue that the textbook approach to handle Skolem’s paradox cannot be generalized to solve the parallel higher-order paradoxes, unless it is augmented by the claim that there is no unique language within which the practice of mathematics can be formalized. Then, we argue that Bays’ solution to the original Skolem’s paradox, unlike the textbook solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.

Palabras clave

  • First-order logic
  • Löwenheim number
  • mathematical practice
  • second-order logic
  • Skolem’s paradox
Acceso abierto

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 51 - 63

Resumen

Abstract

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.

Palabras clave

  • Classical first-order logic
  • discrete plurality
  • singular logic
  • solid plural logic
  • solid plurality
4 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Necessarily the Old Riddle Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 1 - 26

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, I will discuss accounts to solve the problem of induction by introducing necessary connections. The basic idea is this: if we know that there are necessary connections between properties F and G such that F -ness necessarily brings about G-ness, then we are justified to infer that all, including future or unobserved, F s will be Gs. To solve the problem of induction with ontology has been proposed by David Armstrong and Brian Ellis. In this paper, I will argue that these attempts to solve the problem of induction fail. Necessary connections fail to reliably imply the respective regularities for two main reasons: Firstly, according to an argument originally presented by Helen Beebee, the respective necessary connections might be time-limited, and hence do not warrant inferences about future cases. As I will discuss, arguments against the possibility or explanatory power of time-limited necessary connections fail. Secondly, even time-unlimited necessary connections do not entail strict or non-strict regularities, and nor do they allow inferences about individual cases, which is an important function of inductive reasoning. Moreover, the proposed solution to the problem of induction would only apply to a tiny minority of inductive inferences. I argue that most inductive inferences are not easily reducible to the proposed inference pattern, as the vast majority of everyday inductive inferences do not involve necessary connections between fundamental physical properties or essences.

Palabras clave

  • Dispositional essentialism
  • laws of nature
  • necessary connections
  • problem of induction
Acceso abierto

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 27 - 40

Resumen

Abstract

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.

Palabras clave

  • Assertion
  • constitutive norms
  • philosophy of language
  • rule-breaking
  • Timothy Williamson
Acceso abierto

Higher-Order Skolem’s Paradoxes and the Practice of Mathematics: a Note

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 41 - 49

Resumen

Abstract

We will formulate some analogous higher-order versions of Skolem’s paradox and assess the generalizability of two solutions for Skolem’s paradox to these paradoxes: the textbook approach and that of Bays (2000). We argue that the textbook approach to handle Skolem’s paradox cannot be generalized to solve the parallel higher-order paradoxes, unless it is augmented by the claim that there is no unique language within which the practice of mathematics can be formalized. Then, we argue that Bays’ solution to the original Skolem’s paradox, unlike the textbook solution, can be generalized to solve the higher-order paradoxes without any implication about the possibility or order of a language in which mathematical practice is to be formalized.

Palabras clave

  • First-order logic
  • Löwenheim number
  • mathematical practice
  • second-order logic
  • Skolem’s paradox
Acceso abierto

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)

Publicado en línea: 29 Aug 2022
Páginas: 51 - 63

Resumen

Abstract

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.

Palabras clave

  • Classical first-order logic
  • discrete plurality
  • singular logic
  • solid plural logic
  • solid plurality

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