Revista y Edición

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 66 (December 2022)
Special Edición: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 65 (November 2022)

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 63 (December 2021)
Special Edición on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 55 (December 2019)
Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 54 (December 2019)
Special Edición: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 49 (November 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 48 (May 2018)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 47 (December 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 46 (November 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 45 (October 2017)

Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 44 (May 2017)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 43 (November 2016)

Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 42 (May 2016)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 41 (November 2015)

Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 40 (May 2015)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 39 (November 2014)

Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 38 (May 2014)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 34 (December 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 33 (November 2012)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 32 (May 2012)
New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Edición 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Edición 28 (May 2010)

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 27 (November 2009)
Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 26 (May 2009)

Volumen 3 (2008): Edición 25 (November 2008)

Volumen 2 (2008): Edición 24 (May 2008)

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 23 (November 2007)
Normativity and Rationality

Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 22 (May 2007)

Volumen 2 (2006): Edición 21 (November 2006)

Volumen 1 (2006): Edición 20 (May 2006)

Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 19 (November 2005)

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Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 15 (November 2003)

Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 14 (May 2003)

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Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 11 (November 2001)

Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 11-12 (May 2002)

Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 10 (May 2001)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 9 (November 2000)

Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 8 (May 2000)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 7 (November 1999)

Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 6 (May 1999)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 5-2 (November 1998)
Special Edición: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 5-1 (June 1998)
Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 4 (May 1998)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1996): Edición 1 (December 1996)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
01 Dec 1996
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés, Portuguese

Buscar

Volumen 2 (2006): Edición 21 (November 2006)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
01 Dec 1996
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés, Portuguese

Buscar

5 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 1 - 17

Resumen

Abstract

Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller’s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller’s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.

Acceso abierto

On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 19 - 37

Resumen

Abstract

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.

Acceso abierto

A defence of Fregean propositions

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 39 - 64

Resumen

Abstract

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.

Acceso abierto

Whyte on desire fulfilment conditions: a simple problem

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 65 - 68

Resumen

Abstract

According to Jamie Whyte, the proper assignment of fulfilment conditions to an agent’s set of desires proceeds in three steps. First, one identifies various desire extinction and behavioural reinforcement conditions to obtain the fulfilment conditions of a certain subset of the agent’s desires. With these fulfilment conditions in hand, one then appeals to a principle connecting desire fulfilment conditions with belief truth conditions to obtain the truth conditions of a number of the agent’s beliefs. Finally, one uses these belief truth conditions to generate, via a third principle, the fulfilment conditions for the remaining desires. There is, however, a very straightforward reason why this strategy cannot yield the required results.

Acceso abierto

Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 69 - 90

Resumen

Abstract

In a recent book, The Problem of the Soul, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration.

5 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 1 - 17

Resumen

Abstract

Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller’s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism. In this paper I argue that Heller’s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.

Acceso abierto

On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 19 - 37

Resumen

Abstract

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.

Acceso abierto

A defence of Fregean propositions

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 39 - 64

Resumen

Abstract

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.

Acceso abierto

Whyte on desire fulfilment conditions: a simple problem

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 65 - 68

Resumen

Abstract

According to Jamie Whyte, the proper assignment of fulfilment conditions to an agent’s set of desires proceeds in three steps. First, one identifies various desire extinction and behavioural reinforcement conditions to obtain the fulfilment conditions of a certain subset of the agent’s desires. With these fulfilment conditions in hand, one then appeals to a principle connecting desire fulfilment conditions with belief truth conditions to obtain the truth conditions of a number of the agent’s beliefs. Finally, one uses these belief truth conditions to generate, via a third principle, the fulfilment conditions for the remaining desires. There is, however, a very straightforward reason why this strategy cannot yield the required results.

Acceso abierto

Flanagan and Cartesian free will: a defense of agent causation

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 69 - 90

Resumen

Abstract

In a recent book, The Problem of the Soul, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration.