Revista y Edición

Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 62 (December 2021)
Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 61 (November 2021)

Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 60 (May 2021)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 59 (December 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 58 (December 2020)
SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 57 (November 2020)

Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 56 (May 2020)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 55 (December 2019)
Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 54 (December 2019)
Special Edición: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 53 (November 2019)

Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 52 (May 2019)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018)
SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 50 (December 2018)

Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 49 (November 2018)

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Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 37 (November 2013)

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 36 (October 2013)
Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files

Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 35 (May 2013)

Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 34 (December 2012)

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New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 31 (November 2011)

Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011)
XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia

Volumen 4 (2010): Edición 29 (November 2010)
Petrus Hispanus 2009

Volumen 3 (2010): Edición 28 (May 2010)

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Homage to M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 26 (May 2009)

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Volumen 2 (2008): Edición 24 (May 2008)

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Normativity and Rationality

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Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 3 (November 1997)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s2 (November 1998)
Special Edición: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Volumen 1 (1997): Edición 2 (May 1997)

Volumen 1 (1996): Edición 1 (December 1996)

Volumen 1 (1998): Edición s1 (June 1998)
Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

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Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 18 (May 2005)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
2182-2875
Publicado por primera vez
16 Apr 2017
Periodo de publicación
4 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

7 Artículos
Acceso abierto

The Impossibility of Temporal Relations Between Non-Identical Times: New Arguments for Presentism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 91 - 125

Resumen

Abstract

I argue that relations between non-identical times, such as the relations, earlier than, later than, or 10 seconds apart, involve contradiction, and only co-temporal relations are non-contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non-contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.

Acceso abierto

On The Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 127 - 150

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, intentionality constitutes (or at least grounds) the relational content property providing the individuation conditions of a thought, as a relation to an outer or to an inner object respectively. Yet since intentionality turns out to be a modal, hence a nonnatural, property, both externalism and relational internalism deny to thoughts at least token-identity with physical states. Finally, I will give some support to the idea that externalism and internalism must be interpreted as doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought.

Acceso abierto

What is it Like to See a Bat? a Critique of Dretske’s Representationalist Theory of Qualia

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 151 - 177

Resumen

Abstract

This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretske’s theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretske’s definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular ‘naturalness’ and ‘mentalness.’ I go on to show that Dretske’s account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit that his kind of qualia have nothing at all to do with what mental life subjectively feels like, or that veridical perception involves qualia and misperception does not.

Acceso abierto

World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 179 - 184

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 185 - 191

Resumen

Acceso abierto

The Things We Mean

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 191 - 197

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 197 - 203

Resumen

7 Artículos
Acceso abierto

The Impossibility of Temporal Relations Between Non-Identical Times: New Arguments for Presentism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 91 - 125

Resumen

Abstract

I argue that relations between non-identical times, such as the relations, earlier than, later than, or 10 seconds apart, involve contradiction, and only co-temporal relations are non-contradictory, which would leave presentism the only non-contradictory theory of time. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.

Acceso abierto

On The Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 127 - 150

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, intentionality constitutes (or at least grounds) the relational content property providing the individuation conditions of a thought, as a relation to an outer or to an inner object respectively. Yet since intentionality turns out to be a modal, hence a nonnatural, property, both externalism and relational internalism deny to thoughts at least token-identity with physical states. Finally, I will give some support to the idea that externalism and internalism must be interpreted as doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought.

Acceso abierto

What is it Like to See a Bat? a Critique of Dretske’s Representationalist Theory of Qualia

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 151 - 177

Resumen

Abstract

This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretske’s theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretske’s definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular ‘naturalness’ and ‘mentalness.’ I go on to show that Dretske’s account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit that his kind of qualia have nothing at all to do with what mental life subjectively feels like, or that veridical perception involves qualia and misperception does not.

Acceso abierto

World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 179 - 184

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 185 - 191

Resumen

Acceso abierto

The Things We Mean

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 191 - 197

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy

Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018
Páginas: 197 - 203

Resumen

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