Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 66 (December 2022) Special Edición: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 65 (November 2022)
Volumen 14 (2022): Edición 64 (May 2022)
Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 63 (December 2021) Special Edición on Nothing to Come by Correia & Rosenkranz
Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 62 (December 2021) Ethics and Aesthetics: Edicións at Their Intersection
Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 61 (November 2021)
Volumen 13 (2021): Edición 60 (May 2021)
Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 59 (December 2020)
Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 58 (December 2020) SPECIAL ISSUE: ON THE VERY IDEA OF LOGICAL FORM
Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 57 (November 2020)
Volumen 12 (2020): Edición 56 (May 2020)
Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 55 (December 2019) Special Edición: Chalmers on Virtual Reality
Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 54 (December 2019) Special Edición: III Blasco Disputatio, Singular terms in fiction. Fictional and “real” names
Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 53 (November 2019)
Volumen 11 (2019): Edición 52 (May 2019)
Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 51 (December 2018) SYMPOSIUM ON JASON STANLEY’S “HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS”
Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 50 (December 2018)
Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 49 (November 2018)
Volumen 10 (2018): Edición 48 (May 2018)
Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 47 (December 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 46 (November 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 45 (October 2017)
Volumen 9 (2017): Edición 44 (May 2017)
Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 43 (November 2016)
Volumen 8 (2016): Edición 42 (May 2016)
Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 41 (November 2015)
Volumen 7 (2015): Edición 40 (May 2015)
Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 39 (November 2014)
Volumen 6 (2014): Edición 38 (May 2014)
Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 37 (November 2013)
Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 36 (October 2013) Book symposium on François Recanati’s Mental Files
Volumen 5 (2013): Edición 35 (May 2013)
Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 34 (December 2012)
Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 33 (November 2012)
Volumen 4 (2012): Edición 32 (May 2012) New Perspectives on Quine’s “Word and Object”
Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 31 (November 2011)
Volumen 4 (2011): Edición 30 (May 2011) XII Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Volumen 4 (2010): Edición 29 (November 2010) Petrus Hispanus 2009
Volumen 3 (2010): Edición 28 (May 2010)
Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 27 (November 2009) Homage to M. S. Lourenço
Volumen 3 (2009): Edición 26 (May 2009)
Volumen 3 (2008): Edición 25 (November 2008)
Volumen 2 (2008): Edición 24 (May 2008)
Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 23 (November 2007) Normativity and Rationality
Volumen 2 (2007): Edición 22 (May 2007)
Volumen 2 (2006): Edición 21 (November 2006)
Volumen 1 (2006): Edición 20 (May 2006)
Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 19 (November 2005)
Volumen 1 (2005): Edición 18 (May 2005)
Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 17 (November 2004)
Volumen 1 (2004): Edición 16 (May 2004)
Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 15 (November 2003)
Volumen 1 (2003): Edición 14 (May 2003)
Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 13 (November 2002)
Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 11 (November 2001)
Volumen 1 (2002): Edición 11-12 (May 2002)
Volumen 1 (2001): Edición 10 (May 2001)
Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 9 (November 2000)
Volumen 1 (2000): Edición 8 (May 2000)
Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 7 (November 1999)
Volumen 1 (1999): Edición 6 (May 1999)
Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 5-2 (November 1998) Special Edición: Petrus Hispanus Lectures 1998: o Mental e o Físico, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Volumen 1 (1998): Edición 5-1 (June 1998) Special Edición: Language, Logic and Mind Forum, Guest Editors: Joao Branquinho; M. S. Lourenço
Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018 Páginas: 259 - 274
Resumen
Abstract
The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.
Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018 Páginas: 275 - 291
Resumen
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.
Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018 Páginas: 293 - 307
Resumen
Abstract
In the current debate on how ordinary objects persist through time, more than one philosopher has endorsed the following two theses: stage theory and diachronic universalism. In this paper, I would like to offer a solution to the problem (related to lingering properties) that Balashov poses to the joint acceptance of these theses. I will also offer a number of reasons why, even if it is not necessary to undermine Balashov’s counterexamples, stage theorists can, without making their theory less appealing, reject Balashov’s understanding of sorts, which plays a crucial role in his criticisms of stage universalism.
Publicado en línea: 31 Dec 2018 Páginas: 309 - 315
Resumen
Abstract
In her study Fiction and Imagination: The Anthropological Function of Literature (2000), Margit Sutrop criticizes Gregory Currie’s theory of fiction-making, as presented in The Nature of Fiction(1990), for using an inappropriate conception of the author’s ‘fictive intention.’ As Sutrop sees it, Currie is mistaken in reducing the author’s fictive intention to that of achieving a certain response in the audience. In this paper, I shall discuss Sutrop’s theory of fiction-making and argue that although her view is insightful in distinguishing the illocutionary effect and the perlocutionary effect in the author’s fictive intention, there are flaws in it. My aim is to show that, first, Sutrop’s critique of Currie’s view is misguided and, second, her own definition of fiction as the author’s expression of her imagination is problematic in not distinguishing literary fiction-making from other discursive functions and in dismissing the literary practice which regulates the production of literary fictions.
The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.
In this paper, I argue that ordinary cases of self-deception and akrasia derive from the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is typically induced by the influence that desires and emotions exert upon our cognitive faculties, and thereby upon the process of belief formation. Crucially, I show that this hypothesis is consistent with the empirical research carried out by social psychologists, and that it avoids a number of paradoxes that undermine the ‘intentionalist’ account. But motivated irrationality also seems to account for most cases of akrasia, insofar as desires are equally liable to affect the evaluative judgments through which we assess feasible options. This analysis thus set the premises for a unified account of irrationality.
In the current debate on how ordinary objects persist through time, more than one philosopher has endorsed the following two theses: stage theory and diachronic universalism. In this paper, I would like to offer a solution to the problem (related to lingering properties) that Balashov poses to the joint acceptance of these theses. I will also offer a number of reasons why, even if it is not necessary to undermine Balashov’s counterexamples, stage theorists can, without making their theory less appealing, reject Balashov’s understanding of sorts, which plays a crucial role in his criticisms of stage universalism.
In her study Fiction and Imagination: The Anthropological Function of Literature (2000), Margit Sutrop criticizes Gregory Currie’s theory of fiction-making, as presented in The Nature of Fiction(1990), for using an inappropriate conception of the author’s ‘fictive intention.’ As Sutrop sees it, Currie is mistaken in reducing the author’s fictive intention to that of achieving a certain response in the audience. In this paper, I shall discuss Sutrop’s theory of fiction-making and argue that although her view is insightful in distinguishing the illocutionary effect and the perlocutionary effect in the author’s fictive intention, there are flaws in it. My aim is to show that, first, Sutrop’s critique of Currie’s view is misguided and, second, her own definition of fiction as the author’s expression of her imagination is problematic in not distinguishing literary fiction-making from other discursive functions and in dismissing the literary practice which regulates the production of literary fictions.