Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle

DeRose, Keith. 1991. Epistemic possibilities. The Philosophical Review 100, 581-605.10.2307/2185175Abierto DOISearch in Google Scholar

DeRose, Keith. 1999. Can it be that it would have been even though it might not have been? Philosophical Perspectives 13, 385-413.Search in Google Scholar

Eagle, Antony. ‘Might’ counterfactuals. Unpublished. Retrieved through the author’s website on September 26, 2010 from dl.dropbox.com/u/6362052/might-cfacts.pdf.Search in Google Scholar

Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese 30, 265-300.10.1007/BF00485047Abierto DOISearch in Google Scholar

Hacking, Ian. 1967. Possibility. The Philosophical Review 76, 143-168.Search in Google Scholar

Hawthorne, Jon. 2005. Chance and counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, 396-405.10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00534.xAbierto DOISearch in Google Scholar

Heller, Mark. 1995. Might-counterfactuals and gratuitous differences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, 91-101.Search in Google Scholar

Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar

Lewis, David. 1979a. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 339-359.Search in Google Scholar

Lewis, David. 1979b. Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs 13, 455-476.Search in Google Scholar

Lewis, David. 1986. Postscript to ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’. In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195036468.003.0002Search in Google Scholar

Stalnaker, Robert. 1968. A theory of conditionals. Studies in Logical Theory: American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series 2, 98–122.Search in Google Scholar

Stalnaker, Robert. 1981. A defense of conditional excluded middle. In Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. Edited by W. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_4Search in Google Scholar

van Fraasen, Bas. 1966. Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic. Journal of Philosophy 63, 481-495.10.2307/2024549Abierto DOISearch in Google Scholar

Williams, J. Robert G. 2008. Chances, counterfactuals and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, 385-420.Search in Google Scholar

Williams, J. Robert G. 2010. Defending conditional excluded middle. Noûs 44, 650-668.Search in Google Scholar

• Formalizing English Contextuals
• Introduction: Varieties of Context-Sensitivity in a Pluri-Propositionalist Reflexive Semantic Framework
• Propositions, Representations and Pluri-Propositionalism
• Comparatives in Context
• Indexicals in Fiction
• First-Person Plural Indexicals