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Volume 40 (2015): Issue 1 (March 2015)

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Mechanisms and Methods of Decision Making / Ed. by Ewa Roszkowska

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Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

Volume 40 (2015): Issue 1 (March 2015)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
ISSN
0860-150X
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

16 Articles
Open Access

Foreword – Cognitive Science: A New Science with a Considerable Tradition

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 7 - 12

Abstract

Abstract

We ask which ideas of cognitive science have their roots in traditional logic, grammar and rhetoric.We also emphasize the presence of cognitive science in the pages of Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric since its very beginning.

Keywords

  • grammar
  • logic
  • rhetoric
  • cognitive science
Open Access

On Accelerations in Science Driven by Daring Ideas: Good Messages from Fallibilistic Rationalism

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 19 - 41

Abstract

Abstract

The first good message is to the effect that people possess reason as a source of intellectual insights, not available to the senses, as e.g. axioms of arithmetic. The awareness of this fact is called rationalism. Another good message is that reason can daringly quest for and gain new plausible insights. Those, if suitably checked and confirmed, can entail a revision of former results, also in mathematics, and - due to the greater efficiency of new ideas - accelerate science’s progress. The awareness that no insight is secured against revision, is called fallibilism.

This modern fallibilistic rationalism (Peirce, Popper, Gödel, etc. oppose the fundamentalism of the classical version (Plato, Descartes etc.), i.e. the belief in the attainability of inviolable truths of reason which would forever constitute the foundations of knowledge. Fallibilistic rationalism is based on the idea that any problem-solving consists in processing information. Its results vary with respect to informativeness and its reverse - certainty. It is up to science to look for highly informative solutions, in spite of their uncertainty, and then to make them more certain through testing against suitable evidence. To account for such cognitive processes, one resorts to the conceptual apparatus of logic, informatics, and cognitive science.

Keywords

  • a priori
  • complexity
  • computability
  • fallibilism
  • fallibilistic rationalism
  • fallibility
  • fundamentalism
  • Gödel’s speedup strategy
  • guessing with clues
  • information processing
  • informativeness vs certainty
  • problem-solving
  • risk
Open Access

Evaluating Artificial Models of Cognition

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 43 - 62

Abstract

Abstract

Artificial models of cognition serve different purposes, and their use determines the way they should be evaluated. There are also models that do not represent any particular biological agents, and there is controversy as to how they should be assessed. At the same time, modelers do evaluate such models as better or worse. There is also a widespread tendency to call for publicly available standards of replicability and benchmarking for such models. In this paper, I argue that proper evaluation of models does not depend on whether they target real biological agents or not; instead, the standards of evaluation depend on the use of models rather than on the reality of their targets. I discuss how models are validated depending on their use and argue that all-encompassing benchmarks for models may be well beyond reach.

Keywords

  • modeling
  • mechanism
  • mechanistic models
  • scaffolding
  • explanatory focus
  • idealization
Open Access

Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 63 - 90

Abstract

Abstract

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.

Keywords

  • mechanistic explanation
  • representationalism
  • antirepresentationalism
  • mental representation
  • s-representation
  • emulation theory
  • predictive coding
Open Access

How Far we Can Go Without Looking Under the Skin: The Bounds of Cognitive Science

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 91 - 109

Abstract

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.

Keywords

  • cognitive science
  • distributed cognition
  • externalism
  • internalism
  • representations
Open Access

Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 111 - 128

Abstract

Abstract

The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.

Keywords

  • extended mind
  • cognitive system
  • epistemic justification
  • epistemic subject
  • knowledge
  • belief
Open Access

On a Cognitive Model of Semiosis

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 129 - 144

Abstract

Abstract

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems (Zlatev, 2002) like animals, or even plants (Krampen, 1992). It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that (at least some) semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial (computational) systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general.

Keywords

  • semiotic systems
  • sign
  • Peirce
  • artificial cognitive agents
  • semantic networks
  • GLAIR/SNePS architecture
Open Access

The Default Mode Network and the Problem of Determining Intrinsic Mental Contents

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 145 - 160

Abstract

Abstract

We provide a brief overview of the shift toward the intrinsic view of brain activity, describing in particular the structural and functional connectivity patterns of the “Default mode network” (part I). We then consider the Default mode network in a specifically cognitive setting and ask what changes the focus on the Default mode network and other sorts of intrinsic activity require from models put forward by cognitive neuroscientists (part II).

Keywords

  • default mode network
  • intrinsic mental contents
  • resting state networks
  • cognitive neuroscience
  • reactive paradigm in neuroscience
Open Access

Metaphoric Confinement of Information

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 161 - 178

Abstract

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to determine how metaphors tackle the probable nature of information and uncertainty in the structure of the communication process. Since the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors holds that metaphoric thinking and doing are unavoidable, they are employed often in explaining the communicating domains. The metaphorical conceptualizing is recognized in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication where such abstract concepts as freedom of choice, choosing probabilities (possibilities), and uncertainty ware conceived in that way. It is described in accord with Reddy’s conduit metaphor and Ritchie’s toolmakers paradigm. In the paper the issue of both the advantages and disadvantages of metaphors is considered: mainly, how they can explain and predict ways in which people communicate their expectations or uncertainties as well as, more practically, how the probable/informational metaphors enable the management of knowledge in libraries or databases.

Keywords

  • metaphor
  • information
  • probability
  • uncertainty
  • cognitive theory of metaphor
  • theory of communication
Open Access

How are Concepts of Infinity Acquired?

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 179 - 217

Abstract

Abstract

Concepts of infinity have been subjects of dispute since antiquity. The main problems of this paper are: is the mind able to acquire a concept of infinity? and: how are concepts of infinity acquired? The aim of this paper is neither to say what the meanings of the word “infinity” are nor what infinity is and whether it exists. However, those questions will be mentioned, but only in necessary extent.

Keywords

  • concept of infinity
Open Access

Evolutionary Schema of Modeling Based on Genetic Algorithms

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 219 - 239

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a populational schema of modeling that consists of: (a) a linear AFSV schema (with four basic stages of abstraction, formalization, simplification, and verification), and (b) a higher-level schema employing the genetic algorithm (with partially random procedures of mutation, crossover, and selection). The basic ideas of the proposed solution are as follows: (1) whole populations of models are considered at subsequent stages of the modeling process, (2) successive populations are subjected to the activity of genetic operators and undergo selection procedures, (3) the basis for selection is the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm (this function corresponds to the model verification criterion and reflects the goal of the model). The schema can be applied to automate the modeling of the mind/brain by means of artificial neural networks: the structure of each network is modified by genetic operators, modified networks undergo a learning cycle, and successive populations of networks are verified during the selection procedure. The whole process can be automated only partially, because it is the researcher who defines the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm.

Keywords

  • modeling
  • modeling schema (linear vs. populational)
  • cognitive models
  • artificial intelligence
  • genetic algorithms
  • artificial neural networks
Open Access

Evolved Mechanisms Versus Underlying Conditional Relations

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 241 - 253

Abstract

Abstract

The social contracts theory claims that, in social exchange circumstances, human reasoning is not necessarily led by logic, but by certain evolved mental mechanisms that are useful for catching offenders. An emblematic experiment carried out with the intention to prove this thesis is the first experiment described by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby in their paper of 2000. Lopez Astorga has questioned that experiment claiming that its results depend on an underlying conditional logical form not taken into account by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby. In this paper, I propose an explanation alternative to that of Lopez Astorga, which does not depend on logical forms and is based on the mental models theory. Thus, I conclude that this other alternative explanation is one more proof that the experiment in question does not demonstrate the fundamental thesis of the social contracts theory.

Keywords

  • conditional relation
  • evolved mechanisms
  • mental models
  • reasoning
  • social contracts
Open Access

On Language Adequacy

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 257 - 292

Abstract

Abstract

The paper concentrates on the problem of adequate reflection of fragments of reality via expressions of language and inter-subjective knowledge about these fragments, called here, in brief, language adequacy. This problem is formulated in several aspects, the most general one being: the compatibility of the language syntax with its bi-level semantics: intensional and extensional. In this paper, various aspects of language adequacy find their logical explication on the ground of the formal-logical theory of syntax T of any categorial language L generated by the so-called classical categorial grammar, and also on the ground of its extension to the bi-level, intensional and ex- tensional semantic-pragmatic theory ST for L. In T, according to the token- type distinction of Ch. S. Peirce, L is characterized first as a language of wellformed expression-tokens (wfe-tokens) - material, concrete objects - and then as a language of wfe-types - abstract objects, classes of wfe-tokens. In ST the semantic-pragmatic notions of meaning and interpretation for wfe-types of L of intensional semantics and the notion of denotation of extensional seman- tics for wfe-types and constituents of knowledge are formalized. These notions allow formulating a postulate (an axiom of categorial adequacy) from which follow all the most important conditions of the language adequacy, including the above, and a structural one connected with three principles of compositionality.

Keywords

  • token-type distinction
  • categorial grammar
  • intensional semantics
  • meaning
  • interpretation
  • constituent of knowledge
  • extensional semantics
  • referring
  • ontological object
  • denotation
  • categorization
  • compatibility of syntax and semantics
  • algebraic models
  • truth
  • compositionality
  • communication
Open Access

Object-Oriented Programming and Representation of Objects

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 293 - 302

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, a lesson is drawn from the way class definitions are provided in object-oriented programming. The distinction is introduced between the visible structure given in a class definition and the hidden structure, and then possible connections are indicated between these two structures and the structure of an entity modeled by the class definition.

Keywords

  • objects-oriented programming
  • representation of objects
  • computer science
  • visible and hidden structures
Open Access

Syllogistic System for the Propagation of Parasites. The Case of Schistosomatidae (Trematoda: Digenea)

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 303 - 319

Abstract

Abstract

In the paper, a new syllogistic system is built up. This system simulates a massive-parallel behavior in the propagation of collectives of parasites. In particular, this system simulates the behavior of collectives of trematode larvae (miracidia and cercariae).

Keywords

  • Physarum polycephalum
  • Trichobilharzia szidati
  • Schistosomatidae
  • Digenea
  • syllogistic
  • cercaria
  • miracidium
Open Access

Marital Success from the Perspective of Kozielecki’s Transgression Model

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 321 - 333

Abstract

Abstract

Spouses exhibit two kinds of behaviours: protective and transgressive. Protective acts are those aiming to overcome current problems, leading to preserving some balance. Transgressive acts are deliberately overstepping everyday marital reality and doing new things in new ways. They lead to changing the relation with the hope of improving it, but also create the risk of deterioration. The more transgressive behaviours spouses exhibit, the more chances they have to get to know each other and experience the joy of being part of a union. Transgressive tendencies stem from a network personality structure and consist of five psychons: cognitive, instrumental, motivational, emotional, and personal. The success of a marriage is the effect of a specific form of transgressive behaviours in marriage exhibited by both spouses, which is recognizing difficulties as they appear, finding their sources, and taking steps together to overcome them.

16 Articles
Open Access

Foreword – Cognitive Science: A New Science with a Considerable Tradition

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 7 - 12

Abstract

Abstract

We ask which ideas of cognitive science have their roots in traditional logic, grammar and rhetoric.We also emphasize the presence of cognitive science in the pages of Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric since its very beginning.

Keywords

  • grammar
  • logic
  • rhetoric
  • cognitive science
Open Access

On Accelerations in Science Driven by Daring Ideas: Good Messages from Fallibilistic Rationalism

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 19 - 41

Abstract

Abstract

The first good message is to the effect that people possess reason as a source of intellectual insights, not available to the senses, as e.g. axioms of arithmetic. The awareness of this fact is called rationalism. Another good message is that reason can daringly quest for and gain new plausible insights. Those, if suitably checked and confirmed, can entail a revision of former results, also in mathematics, and - due to the greater efficiency of new ideas - accelerate science’s progress. The awareness that no insight is secured against revision, is called fallibilism.

This modern fallibilistic rationalism (Peirce, Popper, Gödel, etc. oppose the fundamentalism of the classical version (Plato, Descartes etc.), i.e. the belief in the attainability of inviolable truths of reason which would forever constitute the foundations of knowledge. Fallibilistic rationalism is based on the idea that any problem-solving consists in processing information. Its results vary with respect to informativeness and its reverse - certainty. It is up to science to look for highly informative solutions, in spite of their uncertainty, and then to make them more certain through testing against suitable evidence. To account for such cognitive processes, one resorts to the conceptual apparatus of logic, informatics, and cognitive science.

Keywords

  • a priori
  • complexity
  • computability
  • fallibilism
  • fallibilistic rationalism
  • fallibility
  • fundamentalism
  • Gödel’s speedup strategy
  • guessing with clues
  • information processing
  • informativeness vs certainty
  • problem-solving
  • risk
Open Access

Evaluating Artificial Models of Cognition

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 43 - 62

Abstract

Abstract

Artificial models of cognition serve different purposes, and their use determines the way they should be evaluated. There are also models that do not represent any particular biological agents, and there is controversy as to how they should be assessed. At the same time, modelers do evaluate such models as better or worse. There is also a widespread tendency to call for publicly available standards of replicability and benchmarking for such models. In this paper, I argue that proper evaluation of models does not depend on whether they target real biological agents or not; instead, the standards of evaluation depend on the use of models rather than on the reality of their targets. I discuss how models are validated depending on their use and argue that all-encompassing benchmarks for models may be well beyond reach.

Keywords

  • modeling
  • mechanism
  • mechanistic models
  • scaffolding
  • explanatory focus
  • idealization
Open Access

Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 63 - 90

Abstract

Abstract

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.

Keywords

  • mechanistic explanation
  • representationalism
  • antirepresentationalism
  • mental representation
  • s-representation
  • emulation theory
  • predictive coding
Open Access

How Far we Can Go Without Looking Under the Skin: The Bounds of Cognitive Science

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 91 - 109

Abstract

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.

Keywords

  • cognitive science
  • distributed cognition
  • externalism
  • internalism
  • representations
Open Access

Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 111 - 128

Abstract

Abstract

The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.

Keywords

  • extended mind
  • cognitive system
  • epistemic justification
  • epistemic subject
  • knowledge
  • belief
Open Access

On a Cognitive Model of Semiosis

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 129 - 144

Abstract

Abstract

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems (Zlatev, 2002) like animals, or even plants (Krampen, 1992). It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that (at least some) semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial (computational) systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general.

Keywords

  • semiotic systems
  • sign
  • Peirce
  • artificial cognitive agents
  • semantic networks
  • GLAIR/SNePS architecture
Open Access

The Default Mode Network and the Problem of Determining Intrinsic Mental Contents

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 145 - 160

Abstract

Abstract

We provide a brief overview of the shift toward the intrinsic view of brain activity, describing in particular the structural and functional connectivity patterns of the “Default mode network” (part I). We then consider the Default mode network in a specifically cognitive setting and ask what changes the focus on the Default mode network and other sorts of intrinsic activity require from models put forward by cognitive neuroscientists (part II).

Keywords

  • default mode network
  • intrinsic mental contents
  • resting state networks
  • cognitive neuroscience
  • reactive paradigm in neuroscience
Open Access

Metaphoric Confinement of Information

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 161 - 178

Abstract

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to determine how metaphors tackle the probable nature of information and uncertainty in the structure of the communication process. Since the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors holds that metaphoric thinking and doing are unavoidable, they are employed often in explaining the communicating domains. The metaphorical conceptualizing is recognized in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication where such abstract concepts as freedom of choice, choosing probabilities (possibilities), and uncertainty ware conceived in that way. It is described in accord with Reddy’s conduit metaphor and Ritchie’s toolmakers paradigm. In the paper the issue of both the advantages and disadvantages of metaphors is considered: mainly, how they can explain and predict ways in which people communicate their expectations or uncertainties as well as, more practically, how the probable/informational metaphors enable the management of knowledge in libraries or databases.

Keywords

  • metaphor
  • information
  • probability
  • uncertainty
  • cognitive theory of metaphor
  • theory of communication
Open Access

How are Concepts of Infinity Acquired?

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 179 - 217

Abstract

Abstract

Concepts of infinity have been subjects of dispute since antiquity. The main problems of this paper are: is the mind able to acquire a concept of infinity? and: how are concepts of infinity acquired? The aim of this paper is neither to say what the meanings of the word “infinity” are nor what infinity is and whether it exists. However, those questions will be mentioned, but only in necessary extent.

Keywords

  • concept of infinity
Open Access

Evolutionary Schema of Modeling Based on Genetic Algorithms

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 219 - 239

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, I propose a populational schema of modeling that consists of: (a) a linear AFSV schema (with four basic stages of abstraction, formalization, simplification, and verification), and (b) a higher-level schema employing the genetic algorithm (with partially random procedures of mutation, crossover, and selection). The basic ideas of the proposed solution are as follows: (1) whole populations of models are considered at subsequent stages of the modeling process, (2) successive populations are subjected to the activity of genetic operators and undergo selection procedures, (3) the basis for selection is the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm (this function corresponds to the model verification criterion and reflects the goal of the model). The schema can be applied to automate the modeling of the mind/brain by means of artificial neural networks: the structure of each network is modified by genetic operators, modified networks undergo a learning cycle, and successive populations of networks are verified during the selection procedure. The whole process can be automated only partially, because it is the researcher who defines the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm.

Keywords

  • modeling
  • modeling schema (linear vs. populational)
  • cognitive models
  • artificial intelligence
  • genetic algorithms
  • artificial neural networks
Open Access

Evolved Mechanisms Versus Underlying Conditional Relations

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 241 - 253

Abstract

Abstract

The social contracts theory claims that, in social exchange circumstances, human reasoning is not necessarily led by logic, but by certain evolved mental mechanisms that are useful for catching offenders. An emblematic experiment carried out with the intention to prove this thesis is the first experiment described by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby in their paper of 2000. Lopez Astorga has questioned that experiment claiming that its results depend on an underlying conditional logical form not taken into account by Fiddick, Cosmides, and Tooby. In this paper, I propose an explanation alternative to that of Lopez Astorga, which does not depend on logical forms and is based on the mental models theory. Thus, I conclude that this other alternative explanation is one more proof that the experiment in question does not demonstrate the fundamental thesis of the social contracts theory.

Keywords

  • conditional relation
  • evolved mechanisms
  • mental models
  • reasoning
  • social contracts
Open Access

On Language Adequacy

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 257 - 292

Abstract

Abstract

The paper concentrates on the problem of adequate reflection of fragments of reality via expressions of language and inter-subjective knowledge about these fragments, called here, in brief, language adequacy. This problem is formulated in several aspects, the most general one being: the compatibility of the language syntax with its bi-level semantics: intensional and extensional. In this paper, various aspects of language adequacy find their logical explication on the ground of the formal-logical theory of syntax T of any categorial language L generated by the so-called classical categorial grammar, and also on the ground of its extension to the bi-level, intensional and ex- tensional semantic-pragmatic theory ST for L. In T, according to the token- type distinction of Ch. S. Peirce, L is characterized first as a language of wellformed expression-tokens (wfe-tokens) - material, concrete objects - and then as a language of wfe-types - abstract objects, classes of wfe-tokens. In ST the semantic-pragmatic notions of meaning and interpretation for wfe-types of L of intensional semantics and the notion of denotation of extensional seman- tics for wfe-types and constituents of knowledge are formalized. These notions allow formulating a postulate (an axiom of categorial adequacy) from which follow all the most important conditions of the language adequacy, including the above, and a structural one connected with three principles of compositionality.

Keywords

  • token-type distinction
  • categorial grammar
  • intensional semantics
  • meaning
  • interpretation
  • constituent of knowledge
  • extensional semantics
  • referring
  • ontological object
  • denotation
  • categorization
  • compatibility of syntax and semantics
  • algebraic models
  • truth
  • compositionality
  • communication
Open Access

Object-Oriented Programming and Representation of Objects

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 293 - 302

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, a lesson is drawn from the way class definitions are provided in object-oriented programming. The distinction is introduced between the visible structure given in a class definition and the hidden structure, and then possible connections are indicated between these two structures and the structure of an entity modeled by the class definition.

Keywords

  • objects-oriented programming
  • representation of objects
  • computer science
  • visible and hidden structures
Open Access

Syllogistic System for the Propagation of Parasites. The Case of Schistosomatidae (Trematoda: Digenea)

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 303 - 319

Abstract

Abstract

In the paper, a new syllogistic system is built up. This system simulates a massive-parallel behavior in the propagation of collectives of parasites. In particular, this system simulates the behavior of collectives of trematode larvae (miracidia and cercariae).

Keywords

  • Physarum polycephalum
  • Trichobilharzia szidati
  • Schistosomatidae
  • Digenea
  • syllogistic
  • cercaria
  • miracidium
Open Access

Marital Success from the Perspective of Kozielecki’s Transgression Model

Published Online: 10 Apr 2015
Page range: 321 - 333

Abstract

Abstract

Spouses exhibit two kinds of behaviours: protective and transgressive. Protective acts are those aiming to overcome current problems, leading to preserving some balance. Transgressive acts are deliberately overstepping everyday marital reality and doing new things in new ways. They lead to changing the relation with the hope of improving it, but also create the risk of deterioration. The more transgressive behaviours spouses exhibit, the more chances they have to get to know each other and experience the joy of being part of a union. Transgressive tendencies stem from a network personality structure and consist of five psychons: cognitive, instrumental, motivational, emotional, and personal. The success of a marriage is the effect of a specific form of transgressive behaviours in marriage exhibited by both spouses, which is recognizing difficulties as they appear, finding their sources, and taking steps together to overcome them.

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