Volume 33 (2013): Issue 1 (August 2013)

An essential aim of this study is to present principles of the legal interpretation of the term “building structure” for the needs of the imposition of a real estate tax. The analysis of both administrative courts’ judgments and the subject literature indicates lack of consistency in the scope of this term’s meaning. In my opinion, interpretative discrepancies are caused by incorrect legal interpretation of the legal definition. It should be noticed that numerous controversies connected with the legal interpretation of the term building structure are connected with considerable tax burden of this type of building objects. Taxpayers, for obvious reasons, are therefore “interested” in not finding the objects owned by them to be building structures in the meaning of the Tax Law, or possibly in finding only those objects’ specified parts to be building structures. It is easily apparent particularly in the case of objects of complex structures (e.g. cell phones towers, ski lifts, wind farms, facilities used in power engineering industry etc.). On the other hand, however, for many municipalities in Poland, income from building structures’ taxation creates municipal budgets. This way the practice of applying local tax law encounters numerous disputes between taxpayers and self-government tax authorities.

The results of the linguistic interpretation should be verified through systemic and purposive methods of interpretation. That process is especially desirable in the cases where the result of the linguistic interpretation is not unequivocal. Whereas, as practice demonstrates, the quality of tax law is not the best, it is impossible to overestimate the role of the non-linguistic method of interpretation. The object of this paper was to present the role which the linguistic interpretation may play in interpreting the tax law. However it was also important to: place the purposive interpretation among the methods of tax law interpretation and to present static and dynamic elements in tax law interpretation. Within the frames of this paper one can find out about historical interpretation of tax law, economic method of tax law interpretation and purposive interpretation directives. The above considerations allow for posit a thesis according to which purposive interpretation is an indispensable element of the process of interpreting a legal text. Its role in the scope of norms of tax law is, however, peculiar, since it serves only to verify the results of linguistic interpretation. However, it can be indicated that the growth in importance of purposive interpretation is direct proportional to the fall in the quality of tax law regulations.

In order to achieve a desired effect of tax legal interpretation, its linguistic mechanisms are frequently insufficient. Elements of paralinguistic interpretation are more and more often indispensable. It applies inter alia when domestic tax law regulations must be verified in the light of the EU tax law. However, the study depict interpretative problems regarding the institution of remuneration of excess payments, which is regulated in Polish tax law. Considerations presented in this article confirm that legal interpretation of tax law is a complicated process. It is important to establish correct system connection between the analyzed legal regulations and other provisions, often contained in other legal acts. Moreover, it seems necessary to refer to the purpose-oriented interpretation of the law. Only then a chance for a satisfactory final result of the provision’s legal interpretation can be guaranteed. What is more, such an effect will create an element being a part of a logically composed and arranged unity.

Interpretations of the tax law (currently referred to as general and individual interpretations), issued by tax authorities, are a fairly new institution in Poland. They were introduced into the legal system by the Tax Ordinance Act of 29 October 1997. From that time these regulations were deeply changed three times. Now it seems that Polish legislator has finally succeeded in elaborating an appropriate model for binding interpretation of tax law that protects the interests of taxpayers. However, discussed regulations seem to need some other amendments. The objective of this article is to present the evolution of the provisions pertaining to the issuing of the so-called official interpretations of tax law and to point at certain shortcomings of the present regulations.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the powers of tax appeal authorities and their interpretation of the Tax Ordinance Act governing tax hearings.

The tax hearing is part of the tax appeal proceeding and takes place within an additional procedure to supplement the evidence and materials on the case. This means that article 229 of Tax Ordinance Act is the limit of the hearing conducted by the tax body. Tax trial/hearing should be treated as a form of activity in gathering evidence, which operates next to the cabinet proceedings. In the literature, the current forms were considered to be equivalent.

The decision to perform additional procedures to supplement the evidence and materials should always be on that tax appeal authority. The phrase “can perform” should be interpreted by the authority as an obligation to conduct, at least as an order to make a positive or negative assessment of the need for additional evidence.

In the Author’s opinion, there are no objections to carry out certain types of evidence. The appeal tax authority is recognizing the case de novo and is evaluating the facts in a way it is required to assess the completeness of the collected evidence, and the same to determine whether all of the facts have been proven.

The limits of the powers of the tax appeal authority to conduct current investigation determines the content of articles 229 and 233 § 2 of Tax Ordinance Act. The competence of the appeal body, which is not subject to challenge, is to complement the evidence to draw additional conclusions, but not to change the basic findings. It may hear witnesses, appoint experts and confront their opinions, carry out documentary evidence, as necessary to carry out a visual inspection, provided that these activities are within the limits of additional evidence and conduct supplementary materials in the case. All of this evidence can be carried out during the tax hearing ordered by the tax appeal authority.

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and the administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court.

As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case.

It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland.

This article presents crucial problems of enacting and interpretation of local law. According to the Constitution acts of local law are the source of universally binding law in the territory of the organ issuing such enactments. Enacting of local law by the local self-government is the exercise of its law- making function, derived from statutory authorization. Law-making of the local self-government does not have an autonomous character in regard to legal acts. Enacting of local law by local self-government is its duty. The interpretation of the law enacted by the local self-government has its own specifics. Law which is legislated in such way is likely to be corresponding with the expectations of the local community

This paper assesses whether the purposive (functional) interpretation of the term “undertaking” is used by decision-makers in antitrust cases. This article presents a short summary of this research regarding cases related to the abuse of a dominant position. As a rule, priority must be given to the direct meaning of a text. There are, however, important exceptions to the sup- posed rule. A concise examination of the jurisprudence shows that purposive interpretation is used where the provision in question is open to several inter- pretations. This article relates in some form to the problems that arise from the EU-oriented purposive interpretation of the term “undertaking” as defined under Polish antitrust law. The article considers some of them.

The obligation of the legalization of entrepreneurial activity from Article 14 of The Act of July 2, 2004 on the freedom of entrepreneurial activity caused deliberations regarding constitutive or declarative character of the legalization entry and as a result, created a problem with indication of the moment when the public law status of an entrepreneur is acquired (or respectively - lost). The answer to the question whether Central Register and Information of Entrepreneurial Activity or the register of entrepreneurs of the National Court Register have also the creation function incites many controversies and is subject to discussions, in the process of which two main standpoints were formed. It is also important to note that the resolution of the discussed issue not only holds scientific value, but above all, it has significant importance in practice. Therefore, it is necessary and even essential. Furthermore, it is typical for this issue that concerns related thereto and arguments raised during the discussion have their basis in the legislation in force and in fact, encapsulate the favoured path of its interpretation.