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Volume 64 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

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Volume 62 (2020): Issue 1 (June 2020)

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Volume 60 (2019): Issue 1 (December 2019)

Volume 59 (2019): Issue 1 (September 2019)

Volume 58 (2019): Issue 1 (June 2019)

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Volume 55 (2018): Issue 1 (September 2018)

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Volume 46 (2016): Issue 1 (September 2016)

Volume 45 (2016): Issue 1 (June 2016)

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Volume 40 (2015): Issue 1 (March 2015)

Volume 39 (2014): Issue 1 (December 2014)

Volume 38 (2014): Issue 1 (September 2014)

Volume 37 (2014): Issue 1 (June 2014)
Mechanisms and Methods of Decision Making / Ed. by Ewa Roszkowska

Volume 36 (2014): Issue 1 (March 2014)

Volume 35 (2013): Issue 1 (December 2013)

Volume 34 (2013): Issue 1 (October 2013)

Volume 33 (2013): Issue 1 (August 2013)

Volume 32 (2013): Issue 1 (May 2013)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

Volume 36 (2014): Issue 1 (March 2014)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
2199-6059
First Published
08 Aug 2013
Publication timeframe
4 times per year
Languages
English

Search

14 Articles
Open Access

Preface: From Pragmatics and Dialectics to Argument Studies

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 7 - 22

Abstract

Abstract

Pragmatics and dialectics are two disciplines which have been amongst the first and most important partners for argument studies in the exploration of the complex realm of communication. Treating argumentation as a construct consisting of premises and conclusion allows for investigating some interesting properties of the phenomenon of reasoning, but does not capture a variety of aspects related to the usage of natural language and dialogical context in which real-life argumentation is typically embedded. This special issue explores some of the fascinating research questions which emerge when we move beyond logic into the territory of the pragmatics and dialectics of argument.

Keywords

  • pragmatics
  • dialectics
  • argument studies
  • pragma-dialectics
  • The Polish School of Argumentation
Open Access

The Structure and Functions of Language

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 27 - 40

Abstract

Abstract

This paper will discuss the nature of language. I find the present state of the subject, the Philosophy of Language, and the present state of Lin- guistics to be both, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. The problem with the Philosophy of Language is that its practitioners tend to lose sight of the psy- chological reality of language, i.e. of speaking and writing. Historically this is because the Philosophy of Language began with Frege’s logic and has continued to the present day to be heavily influenced by considerations of formal logic. Logicians need not be interested in the psychological reality of logical systems. Frege’s logical system is much more powerful than Aristotle’s, but for all I know Aristotle may be closer to the way people actually think. It does not matter to logicians.

Keywords

  • meaning
  • intentionality
  • language
  • speech acts
  • commitment
Open Access

Speech Act Theory and the Study of Argumentation

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 41 - 58

Abstract

Abstract

:In this paper, the influence of speech act theory and Grice’s the- ory of conversational implicature on the study of argumentation is discussed. First, the role that pragmatic insights play in van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation and Jackson and Jacobs’ conver- sational approach to argumentation is described. Next, a number of examples of recent work by argumentation scholars is presented in which insights from speech act theory play a prominent role.

Keywords

  • adjacency pair
  • conversational argument
  • conversational implica- ture
  • felicity condition
  • pragma-dialectical
  • maxim
  • Principle of Communication
  • speech act
  • strategic manoeuvre
Open Access

Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof: Confrontational Strategies in Dealing with Political Accountability

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 59 - 78

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, the author examines the burden of proof in the argu- mentative confrontations taking part in practices of political accountability. She does so by explaining how politicians maneuver strategically with the burden of proof in an attempt at winning the discussion in which they are involved. After making clear the role of the burden of proof in defining the difference of opinion in argumentative confrontations, the author outlines the constraints imposed by practices of political accountability on the burden of proof. Finally, she analyzes in detail a concrete case in which a politician maneuvers in such a way that his burden of proof is significantly diminished.

Keywords

  • argumentative confrontation
  • burden of proof
  • dialectical route
  • material and procedural starting points
  • political accountability
  • strategic maneuvering
Open Access

Conceptions of Speech Acts in the Theory and Practice of Argumentation: A Case Study of a Debate About Advocating

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 79 - 98

Abstract

Abstract

Far from being of interest only to argumentation theorists, conceptions of speech acts play an important role in practitioners’ self-reflection on their own activities. After a brief review of work by Houtlosser, Jackson and Kauffeld on the ways that speech acts provide normative frameworks for argumentative interactions, this essay examines an ongoing debate among scientists in natural resource fields as to the appropriateness of the speech act of advocating in policy settings. Scientists’ reflections on advocacy align well with current scholarship, and the scholarship in turn can provide a deeper understanding of how to manage the communication challenges scientists face.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • metadiscourse
  • speech acts
  • science-policy interface
  • advocacy
  • advice
Open Access

Linguistic Complexity and Argumentative Unity: A Lvov-Warsaw School Supplement

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 101 - 119

Abstract

Abstract

It is argued that the source of complexity in language is twofold: repetition, and syntactic embedding. The former enables us to return again and again to the same subject across many sentences, and to maintain the coherence of an argument. The latter is governed by two forms of complexification: the functor-argument structure of all languages and the operator-bound-variable mechanism of familiar formal languages. The former is most transparently represented by categorial grammar, and an extension of this can adequately describe the syntax of variable binders. Both developments have roots within the work of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Keywords

  • categorial grammar
  • complexity
  • cohesion
  • definition
  • functor
  • operator
  • proof
Open Access

From Speech Acts to Semantics

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 121 - 142

Abstract

Abstract

Frege introduced the notion of pragmatic force as what distinguishes statements from questions. This distinction was elaborated by Wittgenstein in his later works, and systematised as an account of different kinds of speech acts in formal dialogue theory by Hamblin. It lies at the heart of the inferential semantics more recently developed by Brandom. The present paper attempts to sketch some of the relations between these developments.

Keywords

  • assertion
  • dialogue
  • force (Fregean)
  • force (pragmatic)
  • inferentialism
  • pragmatics
  • semantics
  • speech acts
Open Access

Collective Referential Intentionality in the Semantics of Dialogue

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 143 - 159

Abstract

Abstract

The concept of a dialogue is considered in general terms from the standpoint of its referential presuppositions. The semantics of dialogue implies that dialogue participants must generally have a collective intentionality of agreed-upon references that is minimally sufficient for them to be able to disagree about other things, and ideally for outstanding disagreements to become clearer at successive stages of the dialogue. These points are detailed and illustrated in a fictional dialogue, in which precisely these kinds of referential confusions impede progress in shared understanding. It is only through a continuous exchange of question and answer in this dialogue case study that the meanings of key terms and anaphorical references are disambiguated, and a relevantly complete collective intentionality of shared meaning between dialogue participants is achieved. The importance of a minimally shared referential semantics for the terms entering into reasoning and argument in dialogue contexts broadly construed cannot be over-estimated. Where to draw the line between referential agreement and disagreement within any chosen dialogue, as participants work toward better mutual understanding in clearing up referential incongruities, is sometimes among the dialogue’s main points of dispute.

Keywords

  • ambiguity of meaning
  • collective intentionality
  • dialogue
  • equivocation
  • intentionality
  • meaning
  • semantics
Open Access

Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 161 - 170

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language (extra dictione), amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves Aristotle’s categorization by a quite different account of how qualifications function.

Keywords

  • fallacies
  • language
  • secundum quid
  • hasty generalization
  • the principle of non-contradiction
Open Access

Supporting Argumentation Schemes in Argumentative Dialogue Games

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 171 - 191

Abstract

Abstract

This paper reports preliminary work into the exploitation of argumentation schemes within dialogue games. We identify a property of dialogue games that we call “scheme awareness” that captures the relationship between dialogue game systems and argumentation schemes. Scheme awareness is used to examine the ways in which existing dialogue games utilise argumentation schemes and consequently the degree with which a dialogue game can be used to construct argument structures. The aim is to develop a set of guidelines for dialogue game design, which feed into a set of Dialogue Game Description Language (DGDL) extensions in turn enabling dialogue games to better exploit argumentation schemes.

Open Access

Argumentative Polylogues: Beyond Dialectical Understanding of Fallacies

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 193 - 218

Abstract

Abstract

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • dialectic
  • fallacies
  • false dilemma
  • polylogue
  • straw man
Open Access

Motivated Doubts: A Comment on Walton’S Theory of Criticism

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 221 - 230

Abstract

Abstract

In his theory of criticism, D. N. Walton presupposes that an opponent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing this questioning with any reasoning of her own, or that she puts forward a critical question and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning in defense of an opposite position of her own. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent that needs to be taken into account in any classification of types of criticism, and that should not be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor in a procedure for developing a strategically expedient critique. In this third option, an opponent questions and overtly doubts a statement of the proponent and supplements her doubts with a counterconsideration that explains and motivates her position of critical doubt, yet without supporting any opposite thesis, thereby assisting, as it were, the proponent in his attempt to develop a responsive argumentation, tailor-made to convince this particular opponent. First, I elaborate on the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration. Second, I discuss Walton’s distinction between premises that can be challenged by mere questioning (“ordinary premises” and “assumptions”) and premises that must be challenged by incurring the obligation to offer counter-argumentation (somewhat confusingly labeled “exceptions”). I contend that the latter type of premises, that I would label “normality premises,” can be attacked without incurring a genuine burden of proof. Instead, it can be attacked by means of incurring a burden of criticism (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that amounts to the obligation to offer an explanatory counterconsideration, rather than a convincing ex concessis argument. Of course, providing the opponent with the right to discharge her burden of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations brings a clear strategic ad- vantage to her. It is much less demanding to motivate one’s doubts regarding proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-P. If we want to encourage opponents to act critically, and proponents to develop responsive arguments, the importance of the notions of an explanatory counterconsideration and of a motivated doubt should be emphasized in the theory of criticism.

Keywords

  • burden of criticism
  • counterargument
  • criticism
  • exception
  • explanatory counterconsideration
  • D. N. Walton
Open Access

Justification and Argumentation

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 231 - 239

Abstract

Abstract

In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • deductivism
  • justification
  • reasoning
  • argument evaluation
Open Access

Strategic Manoeuvring and the Selection of Starting Points in the Pragma-Dialectical Framework

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 241 - 249

Abstract

Abstract

The article analyzes strategic manoeuvring within the pragmadialectical framework with respect to the selection of starting points in the opening stage to frame the arguments. The Terri Schiavo case is presented, which can provide interesting insights concerning this issue. I would like to show that resolution of the difference of opinion requires the resolution of a subordinate difference of opinion concerning how to label her medical state, and why discussants were not able to resolve this subordinate difference of opinion. After, the conflict that arises between critical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness is examined and how strategic manoeuvring aims to resolve this conflict. In the final part of the paper I argue that the problems raised can be dealt with within the framework of pragma-dialectics.

Keywords

  • pragma-dialectics
  • strategic manoeuvring
  • starting points
  • fallacies
  • difference of opinion
14 Articles
Open Access

Preface: From Pragmatics and Dialectics to Argument Studies

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 7 - 22

Abstract

Abstract

Pragmatics and dialectics are two disciplines which have been amongst the first and most important partners for argument studies in the exploration of the complex realm of communication. Treating argumentation as a construct consisting of premises and conclusion allows for investigating some interesting properties of the phenomenon of reasoning, but does not capture a variety of aspects related to the usage of natural language and dialogical context in which real-life argumentation is typically embedded. This special issue explores some of the fascinating research questions which emerge when we move beyond logic into the territory of the pragmatics and dialectics of argument.

Keywords

  • pragmatics
  • dialectics
  • argument studies
  • pragma-dialectics
  • The Polish School of Argumentation
Open Access

The Structure and Functions of Language

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 27 - 40

Abstract

Abstract

This paper will discuss the nature of language. I find the present state of the subject, the Philosophy of Language, and the present state of Lin- guistics to be both, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. The problem with the Philosophy of Language is that its practitioners tend to lose sight of the psy- chological reality of language, i.e. of speaking and writing. Historically this is because the Philosophy of Language began with Frege’s logic and has continued to the present day to be heavily influenced by considerations of formal logic. Logicians need not be interested in the psychological reality of logical systems. Frege’s logical system is much more powerful than Aristotle’s, but for all I know Aristotle may be closer to the way people actually think. It does not matter to logicians.

Keywords

  • meaning
  • intentionality
  • language
  • speech acts
  • commitment
Open Access

Speech Act Theory and the Study of Argumentation

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 41 - 58

Abstract

Abstract

:In this paper, the influence of speech act theory and Grice’s the- ory of conversational implicature on the study of argumentation is discussed. First, the role that pragmatic insights play in van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation and Jackson and Jacobs’ conver- sational approach to argumentation is described. Next, a number of examples of recent work by argumentation scholars is presented in which insights from speech act theory play a prominent role.

Keywords

  • adjacency pair
  • conversational argument
  • conversational implica- ture
  • felicity condition
  • pragma-dialectical
  • maxim
  • Principle of Communication
  • speech act
  • strategic manoeuvre
Open Access

Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof: Confrontational Strategies in Dealing with Political Accountability

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 59 - 78

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, the author examines the burden of proof in the argu- mentative confrontations taking part in practices of political accountability. She does so by explaining how politicians maneuver strategically with the burden of proof in an attempt at winning the discussion in which they are involved. After making clear the role of the burden of proof in defining the difference of opinion in argumentative confrontations, the author outlines the constraints imposed by practices of political accountability on the burden of proof. Finally, she analyzes in detail a concrete case in which a politician maneuvers in such a way that his burden of proof is significantly diminished.

Keywords

  • argumentative confrontation
  • burden of proof
  • dialectical route
  • material and procedural starting points
  • political accountability
  • strategic maneuvering
Open Access

Conceptions of Speech Acts in the Theory and Practice of Argumentation: A Case Study of a Debate About Advocating

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 79 - 98

Abstract

Abstract

Far from being of interest only to argumentation theorists, conceptions of speech acts play an important role in practitioners’ self-reflection on their own activities. After a brief review of work by Houtlosser, Jackson and Kauffeld on the ways that speech acts provide normative frameworks for argumentative interactions, this essay examines an ongoing debate among scientists in natural resource fields as to the appropriateness of the speech act of advocating in policy settings. Scientists’ reflections on advocacy align well with current scholarship, and the scholarship in turn can provide a deeper understanding of how to manage the communication challenges scientists face.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • metadiscourse
  • speech acts
  • science-policy interface
  • advocacy
  • advice
Open Access

Linguistic Complexity and Argumentative Unity: A Lvov-Warsaw School Supplement

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 101 - 119

Abstract

Abstract

It is argued that the source of complexity in language is twofold: repetition, and syntactic embedding. The former enables us to return again and again to the same subject across many sentences, and to maintain the coherence of an argument. The latter is governed by two forms of complexification: the functor-argument structure of all languages and the operator-bound-variable mechanism of familiar formal languages. The former is most transparently represented by categorial grammar, and an extension of this can adequately describe the syntax of variable binders. Both developments have roots within the work of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Keywords

  • categorial grammar
  • complexity
  • cohesion
  • definition
  • functor
  • operator
  • proof
Open Access

From Speech Acts to Semantics

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 121 - 142

Abstract

Abstract

Frege introduced the notion of pragmatic force as what distinguishes statements from questions. This distinction was elaborated by Wittgenstein in his later works, and systematised as an account of different kinds of speech acts in formal dialogue theory by Hamblin. It lies at the heart of the inferential semantics more recently developed by Brandom. The present paper attempts to sketch some of the relations between these developments.

Keywords

  • assertion
  • dialogue
  • force (Fregean)
  • force (pragmatic)
  • inferentialism
  • pragmatics
  • semantics
  • speech acts
Open Access

Collective Referential Intentionality in the Semantics of Dialogue

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 143 - 159

Abstract

Abstract

The concept of a dialogue is considered in general terms from the standpoint of its referential presuppositions. The semantics of dialogue implies that dialogue participants must generally have a collective intentionality of agreed-upon references that is minimally sufficient for them to be able to disagree about other things, and ideally for outstanding disagreements to become clearer at successive stages of the dialogue. These points are detailed and illustrated in a fictional dialogue, in which precisely these kinds of referential confusions impede progress in shared understanding. It is only through a continuous exchange of question and answer in this dialogue case study that the meanings of key terms and anaphorical references are disambiguated, and a relevantly complete collective intentionality of shared meaning between dialogue participants is achieved. The importance of a minimally shared referential semantics for the terms entering into reasoning and argument in dialogue contexts broadly construed cannot be over-estimated. Where to draw the line between referential agreement and disagreement within any chosen dialogue, as participants work toward better mutual understanding in clearing up referential incongruities, is sometimes among the dialogue’s main points of dispute.

Keywords

  • ambiguity of meaning
  • collective intentionality
  • dialogue
  • equivocation
  • intentionality
  • meaning
  • semantics
Open Access

Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 161 - 170

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper I will consider several interpretations of the fallacy of secundum quid as it is given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations and argue that they do not work, one reason for which is that they all imply that the fallacy depends on language and thus fail to explain why Aristotle lists this fallacy among the fallacies not depending on language (extra dictione), amounting often to a claim that Aristotle miscategorises this fallacy. I will argue for a reading that preserves Aristotle’s categorization by a quite different account of how qualifications function.

Keywords

  • fallacies
  • language
  • secundum quid
  • hasty generalization
  • the principle of non-contradiction
Open Access

Supporting Argumentation Schemes in Argumentative Dialogue Games

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 171 - 191

Abstract

Abstract

This paper reports preliminary work into the exploitation of argumentation schemes within dialogue games. We identify a property of dialogue games that we call “scheme awareness” that captures the relationship between dialogue game systems and argumentation schemes. Scheme awareness is used to examine the ways in which existing dialogue games utilise argumentation schemes and consequently the degree with which a dialogue game can be used to construct argument structures. The aim is to develop a set of guidelines for dialogue game design, which feed into a set of Dialogue Game Description Language (DGDL) extensions in turn enabling dialogue games to better exploit argumentation schemes.

Open Access

Argumentative Polylogues: Beyond Dialectical Understanding of Fallacies

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 193 - 218

Abstract

Abstract

Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • dialectic
  • fallacies
  • false dilemma
  • polylogue
  • straw man
Open Access

Motivated Doubts: A Comment on Walton’S Theory of Criticism

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 221 - 230

Abstract

Abstract

In his theory of criticism, D. N. Walton presupposes that an opponent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing this questioning with any reasoning of her own, or that she puts forward a critical question and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning in defense of an opposite position of her own. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent that needs to be taken into account in any classification of types of criticism, and that should not be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor in a procedure for developing a strategically expedient critique. In this third option, an opponent questions and overtly doubts a statement of the proponent and supplements her doubts with a counterconsideration that explains and motivates her position of critical doubt, yet without supporting any opposite thesis, thereby assisting, as it were, the proponent in his attempt to develop a responsive argumentation, tailor-made to convince this particular opponent. First, I elaborate on the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration. Second, I discuss Walton’s distinction between premises that can be challenged by mere questioning (“ordinary premises” and “assumptions”) and premises that must be challenged by incurring the obligation to offer counter-argumentation (somewhat confusingly labeled “exceptions”). I contend that the latter type of premises, that I would label “normality premises,” can be attacked without incurring a genuine burden of proof. Instead, it can be attacked by means of incurring a burden of criticism (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that amounts to the obligation to offer an explanatory counterconsideration, rather than a convincing ex concessis argument. Of course, providing the opponent with the right to discharge her burden of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations brings a clear strategic ad- vantage to her. It is much less demanding to motivate one’s doubts regarding proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-P. If we want to encourage opponents to act critically, and proponents to develop responsive arguments, the importance of the notions of an explanatory counterconsideration and of a motivated doubt should be emphasized in the theory of criticism.

Keywords

  • burden of criticism
  • counterargument
  • criticism
  • exception
  • explanatory counterconsideration
  • D. N. Walton
Open Access

Justification and Argumentation

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 231 - 239

Abstract

Abstract

In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.

Keywords

  • argumentation
  • deductivism
  • justification
  • reasoning
  • argument evaluation
Open Access

Strategic Manoeuvring and the Selection of Starting Points in the Pragma-Dialectical Framework

Published Online: 12 Apr 2014
Page range: 241 - 249

Abstract

Abstract

The article analyzes strategic manoeuvring within the pragmadialectical framework with respect to the selection of starting points in the opening stage to frame the arguments. The Terri Schiavo case is presented, which can provide interesting insights concerning this issue. I would like to show that resolution of the difference of opinion requires the resolution of a subordinate difference of opinion concerning how to label her medical state, and why discussants were not able to resolve this subordinate difference of opinion. After, the conflict that arises between critical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness is examined and how strategic manoeuvring aims to resolve this conflict. In the final part of the paper I argue that the problems raised can be dealt with within the framework of pragma-dialectics.

Keywords

  • pragma-dialectics
  • strategic manoeuvring
  • starting points
  • fallacies
  • difference of opinion

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