<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This paper uses queuing theory to examine the linkages between legal and illegal immigration. This approach is particularly appropriate for periods of mass migration and can be used to look at how the <italic>magnitude</italic> of people trying to migrate affects the choice between legal and illegal channels. An empirical illustration shows how origin-country conflict and past migration differently affect current legal and illegal flows. With data for Schengen countries from Eurostat for documented immigration and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) for illegal border crossings (IBCs), I implement a generalized method of moments (GMM) strategy using different estimates of conflict-related deaths and lagged flows of immigration as external and internal instruments, respectively. Violent conflict has a positive and significant effect on IBCs but not on documented migration flows. I find evidence of positive spillovers from the legal channel of immigration into the illegal channel but not vice versa.</p>
</abstract>

This paper uses queuing theory to examine the linkages between legal and illegal immigration. This approach is particularly appropriate for periods of mass migration and can be used to look at how the magnitude of people trying to migrate affects the choice between legal and illegal channels. An empirical illustration shows how origin-country conflict and past migration differently affect current legal and illegal flows. With data for Schengen countries from Eurostat for documented immigration and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) for illegal border crossings (IBCs), I implement a generalized method of moments (GMM) strategy using different estimates of conflict-related deaths and lagged flows of immigration as external and internal instruments, respectively. Violent conflict has a positive and significant effect on IBCs but not on documented migration flows. I find evidence of positive spillovers from the legal channel of immigration into the illegal channel but not vice versa.

Queuing to leave: A new approach to immigration

IZA Journal of Development and Migration

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Queuing to leave: A new approach to immigration"}

This paper uses queuing theory to examine the linkages between legal and illegal immigration. This approach is particularly appropriate for periods of mass...

Queuing to leave: A new approach to immigration

Data publikacji: 12 lip 2021

Zakres stron: -

Przyjęty: 19 kwi 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2021-0007

Słowa kluczowe
immigration, queuing theory, conflict

© 2021 Nayantara Sarma, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Queuing to leave: A new approach to immigration

Data publikacji: 12 lip 2021

Zakres stron: -

Przyjęty: 19 kwi 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2021-0007

Słowa kluczoweimmigration, queuing theory, conflict

© 2021 Nayantara Sarma, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
immigration, queuing theory, conflict