Rivista e Edizione

Volume 33 (2022): Edizione 1 (September 2022)

Volume 32 (2021): Edizione 1 (December 2021)

Volume 31 (2021): Edizione 1 (October 2021)

Volume 30 (2020): Edizione 1 (December 2020)

Volume 29 (2019): Edizione 1 (December 2019)

Volume 28 (2018): Edizione 1 (October 2018)

Volume 27 (2018): Edizione 1 (April 2018)

Volume 26 (2017): Edizione 1 (October 2017)

Volume 25 (2012): Edizione 1 (October 2012)

Volume 24 (2012): Edizione 1 (April 2012)

Volume 22-23 (2011): Edizione 1 (October 2011)

Volume 20-21 (2010): Edizione 1 (October 2010)

Volume 18-19 (2009): Edizione 1 (October 2009)

Volume 16-17 (2008): Edizione 1 (October 2008)

Volume 15 (2008): Edizione 1 (April 2008)

Volume 14 (2007): Edizione 1 (April 2007)

Volume 13 (2007): Edizione 1 (October 2007)

Volume 12 (2006): Edizione 1 (October 2006)

Volume 11 (2006): Edizione 1 (April 2006)

Volume 10 (2005): Edizione 1 (October 2005)

Volume 9 (2004): Edizione 1 (October 2004)

Volume 8 (2004): Edizione 1 (April 2004)

Volume 7 (2003): Edizione 1 (October 2003)

Volume 5-6 (2003): Edizione 1 (April 2003)

Volume 4 (2002): Edizione 1 (October 2002)

Volume 3 (2001): Edizione 1 (October 2001)

Volume 2 (2001): Edizione 1 (April 2001)

Volume 1 (2000): Edizione 1 (October 2000)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2183-0142
Pubblicato per la prima volta
20 Dec 2020
Periodo di pubblicazione
2 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

Volume 2 (2001): Edizione 1 (April 2001)

Dettagli della rivista
Formato
Rivista
eISSN
2183-0142
Pubblicato per la prima volta
20 Dec 2020
Periodo di pubblicazione
2 volte all'anno
Lingue
Inglese

Cerca

6 Articoli
Accesso libero

Caracteres da experiência

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 5 - 36

Astratto

Abstract

The discrimination between two points of view, or perspectives, in respect to consciousness, one on the first-person other on the third-person, deals with two concepts of consciousness- respectively, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness (sections 1 and 2). I will accept, generally, this idea. However, I will argue that are not two, but three kinds of consciousness and typ of experience, making my point introducing the concept of different characters of experience (section 3). These characters are ‘experience’, ‘signification’ and ‘reference/object’, and when all of them occur I say that we have an intentional experience. If it lacks the last one, we have a meaningful experience, but without reference. Finally, if the only occurrence is ‘experience’, then the type of experience we live is a meaningless or mute experience. This ‘taxonomy’ allows classifying a perceptum as an intentional experience, a quale as a meaningful experience and a sense datum as a mute experience. On the other hand, it represents, as I claim, an approach much more clear, than those usually appears, to the question ‘what qualia really are? ‘ (sections 4 e 5). Moreover: it makes possible talk about objectivity of qualia, an objectivity without object (section 6).

Accesso libero

Uma historia aromática em bagdade

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 37 - 50

Astratto

Accesso libero

Da certeza: Husserl e Wittgenstein

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 51 - 61

Astratto

Accesso libero

Paul Ricœur: A Recusa do modelo dialogal na hermenêutica

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 63 - 85

Astratto

Abstract

Every philosophy has a conceptualisation which demarcares it and defines a net of signification, even in the field of filiation or proximity relations. Ricœur’s hermeneutics is admittedly close to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, due to the aim of integrating and rectifying it and to its identical or equivalent conceptualisation (in some cases). My topic concerns the difference between the two hermeneutics, which mainly emerges through the relevance attached to dialogue. The chief question I ask is whether that difference is insignificant and sporadic or, in contrast, is determinant to the description of Ricœur’s hermeneutics, which would mark it out against Gadamer’s. The former establishes a link between dialogue and oralism, which allow us a coherent understanding of not only his opposition to romantic hermeneutics, but also the development of his epistemological project. By analysing these matters we will, therefore, realise the consistency of the hermeneutic paradigm put forward by Ricœur, as well as the progressively clear cut between the two hermeneutical models.

Accesso libero

A dúvida de Descartes e a substância aristotélica

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 87 - 97

Astratto

Accesso libero

Book Review: LÉVY, BERNARD-HENRI, Le Siècle de Sartre, Ed. Bernard Grasset, Paris, 2000

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 101 - 106

Astratto

6 Articoli
Accesso libero

Caracteres da experiência

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 5 - 36

Astratto

Abstract

The discrimination between two points of view, or perspectives, in respect to consciousness, one on the first-person other on the third-person, deals with two concepts of consciousness- respectively, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness (sections 1 and 2). I will accept, generally, this idea. However, I will argue that are not two, but three kinds of consciousness and typ of experience, making my point introducing the concept of different characters of experience (section 3). These characters are ‘experience’, ‘signification’ and ‘reference/object’, and when all of them occur I say that we have an intentional experience. If it lacks the last one, we have a meaningful experience, but without reference. Finally, if the only occurrence is ‘experience’, then the type of experience we live is a meaningless or mute experience. This ‘taxonomy’ allows classifying a perceptum as an intentional experience, a quale as a meaningful experience and a sense datum as a mute experience. On the other hand, it represents, as I claim, an approach much more clear, than those usually appears, to the question ‘what qualia really are? ‘ (sections 4 e 5). Moreover: it makes possible talk about objectivity of qualia, an objectivity without object (section 6).

Accesso libero

Uma historia aromática em bagdade

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 37 - 50

Astratto

Accesso libero

Da certeza: Husserl e Wittgenstein

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 51 - 61

Astratto

Accesso libero

Paul Ricœur: A Recusa do modelo dialogal na hermenêutica

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 63 - 85

Astratto

Abstract

Every philosophy has a conceptualisation which demarcares it and defines a net of signification, even in the field of filiation or proximity relations. Ricœur’s hermeneutics is admittedly close to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, due to the aim of integrating and rectifying it and to its identical or equivalent conceptualisation (in some cases). My topic concerns the difference between the two hermeneutics, which mainly emerges through the relevance attached to dialogue. The chief question I ask is whether that difference is insignificant and sporadic or, in contrast, is determinant to the description of Ricœur’s hermeneutics, which would mark it out against Gadamer’s. The former establishes a link between dialogue and oralism, which allow us a coherent understanding of not only his opposition to romantic hermeneutics, but also the development of his epistemological project. By analysing these matters we will, therefore, realise the consistency of the hermeneutic paradigm put forward by Ricœur, as well as the progressively clear cut between the two hermeneutical models.

Accesso libero

A dúvida de Descartes e a substância aristotélica

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 87 - 97

Astratto

Accesso libero

Book Review: LÉVY, BERNARD-HENRI, Le Siècle de Sartre, Ed. Bernard Grasset, Paris, 2000

Pubblicato online: 14 Dec 2021
Pagine: 101 - 106

Astratto

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