Tom 31 (2021): Zeszyt 1 (October 2021)

In his quest to let language speak, Heidegger explored thoroughly the possibilities of meaning of factical language, in its phenomenological and poietic dimensions. He thereby came to characterize Being and Time as a way, a path which must be followed until it ends. He later understood it as a wandering and, finally, as a dead end (Holzweg). The idea of the walker, in conversation with himself, accompanies this entire journey. The present essay seeks to uncover the main moments of Heidegger’s retrospective and self-interpreting way, based on recent publications of the Gesamtausgabe (in particular GA 82 and 70.1), which he himself wanted to see, generally speaking, as the edition of his Wege, nicht Werke.

In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in Spheres I that Heidegger presented, in Being and Time, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of Being and Time), and taking into account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time.

Although the term “pre-predicative” (vorprädikativ) is used only two times in Being and Time, it qualifies in an essential way the hermeneutical process in which the existentials of understanding, interpretation and discourse cooperate to structure the phenomenal field into a meaningful horizon. This hermeneutical function represents for Heidegger the precondition for every theoretical-predicative behaviour of Dasein towards being. By means of a conceptual-historical analysis throughout the Twenties, it is possible to point out that Heidegger considers the domain of the pre-predicative identical to the hermeneutical process. Nevertheless, on the basis of some indications that are to be found in Heidegger’s writings, we can trace the contours of a different history of the concept of “pre-predicative”, in which the latter hints at a deeper dimension of the human being – a dimension that can be designated as “pathic” or “prehermeneutical”. To this purpose, it is essential to investigate the concept of “pre-worldly” (vorweltlich), introduced by Heidegger in his first lecture course, his analysis of anxiety in 1929 and, finally, the image of the “great silence” (große Stille) in the later Contributions to Philosophy.

Right after the presentation of Hyginus’s fable in §42 of Being and Time comes a note in which Heidegger affirms that the orientation about care as the being of Dasein (§41) arose in the context of the interpretation of Augustinian anthropology and the foundations obtained by the analysis of Aristotelian ontology. Why such a mention and why is it placed precisely after proving the pre-ontological origin of care as the being of Dasein? Assuming such problem, this paper does not aim only at offering a reading key that justifies such note, but at presenting the importance of the factical and pre-ontological aspects presented, respectively, in Book X of The Confessions of Augustine and in the fable of Hyginus for Heidegger's elaboration of care as an ontological category. For this purpose, three lecture courses will be assumed, especially: Augustine and Neo-Platonism (1921), which will make it possible to perceive the always factical aspect of care, thus evidencing the historical enactment perspective of the hermeneutics of facticity; Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (1921/1922), which will make it possible to understand the idea of “ontological category” as a first formulation of what, in Being and Time, will be the existentials; and History of the concept of time: prolegomena (1925), which will allow us to realize that care is about being and not having, therefore, that it is not a possession of Dasein, but a condition of its existence. Finally, after justifying the importance of different aspects for care as an ontological category, it will be understood why the ontological interpretation differs from both others.

This article considers the simultaneously passive and active character of moods (Stimmungen) in Heidegger, focussing on two different periods of his thought: the end of the 1920s and the middle of the 1930s. Through the study of the language used by Heidegger, I show that the ideas of passivity and activity are expressed in three different levels of his description of moods: the more concrete level of one’s experience of a mood, the level of philosophical analysis insofar as it is based on moods and deals with moods, and the transcendental or constitutive level of experience. Moreover, I show that in each of these levels passivity and activity are constitutively intertwined and that Heidegger’s conception of moods both in the 1920s and the 1930s can only be understood if we take into consideration the three levels and the way each of them is characterized by both passivity and activity.

In Sein und Zeit, the Dasein, thrown in the world by Geworfenheit and relaunched by Entwurf (projection) into the future, experiences itself as a “Self”. This exercise of existence cannot escape the critique of solipsism. However, paragraph 29 — about the existentiale of Befindlichkeit — opens an access way to the Other, which later will be ceaselessly explored by Heidegger, after having found the Stimmungen of the Greek beginning in Holderlin’s poetry and the Grund Stimmungen of “the night of the gods” and of the forgetfulness of being of our time. Not until the fifties and the mystical experience of the fourfold (das Geviert) will Heidegger find the possibility of transmuting the experience of the Other from a πόλεμος into a being-in-harmony (stimmen). This unique path of affectivity, asserted in paragraph 29 of Sein und Zeit, will enable Heidegger to reach an essential way of working out the question of Otherness, that only right now we may be starting to understand.

This paper presents a paragraph of my thesis whose guiding thread is the theme of language in Heidegger, and which advances two basic claims: 1) Being and Time is an unfinished book and it is thus in the understanding of the planetary achievement of “nihilism” – i.e., of “technique” – that this work from 1927 assumes its whole meaning; and 2) that said, Heidegger’s work, taken as a whole, is a cohesive work that aims at overcoming “nihilism” understood originarily as “forgetfulness of being”. This overcoming is therefore achieved in two stages: 1) the understanding of the phenomenon of “being” arising from the transcendental understanding of the “world”; and 2) the overcoming of that transcendental understanding of the “world” in the full understanding of the phenomenon of “being” as “history,” a process in which the dialogue with poetry will prove to be decisive. This paper emphasizes one aspect of that evolution of Heidegger’s thought “in dialogue with Heidegger,” showing how the understanding of “Ereignis” allows us to conciliate the understanding of the concept of “Entschlossenheit,” presented in Being and Time, with the concept of “Gelassenheit,” that is central in the second stage of Heidegger’s work.