<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.</p>
</abstract>

From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.

Lying, computers and self-awareness

Centre for the Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Lying, computers and self-awareness"}

From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a...

Lying, computers and self-awareness

Data publikacji: 11 paź 2021

Zakres stron: 10 - 34

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/kjps-2020-0009

Słowa kluczowe
Lying, Philosophy of Lying, Turing Machine, computability, Artificial Intelligence (AI), moral agency, self-awareness, AI singularity, AI ethics

© 2020 Paulo Castro, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Lying, computers and self-awareness

Data publikacji: 11 paź 2021

Zakres stron: 10 - 34

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/kjps-2020-0009

Słowa kluczoweLying, Philosophy of Lying, Turing Machine, computability, Artificial Intelligence (AI), moral agency, self-awareness, AI singularity, AI ethics

© 2020 Paulo Castro, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Lying, Philosophy of Lying, Turing Machine, computability, Artificial Intelligence (AI), moral agency, self-awareness, AI singularity, AI ethics